


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TREATY ANY VALUE?**

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TWO SHILLINGS
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
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
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
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EASTERN WORLD

London January 1955

Offending Asia

MUCH has been heard recently about China's intransigence in international affairs, and of how much harm she is doing herself in the eyes of America and the world by sentencing United States airmen for spying. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, is visiting Peking as much to reason with China about her general attitude as to discuss the case of the airmen. He will, it is reported, try to bring home to Peking the depth of western indignation about China's recent actions and pronouncements.

This attitude of treating China as a slow-witted, unreasonable bully who is not yet certain of the effect his attitudes have on the western world, is misguided to the point of being ludicrous. If it is accepted that the Peking regime cannot be ousted except by a large scale war, and that, in this atomic age, such a war would be the virtual end of life on this planet, and that co-existence with China has gone beyond the argument of whether it is possible, to that of its being absolutely necessary, then it is about time the West woke up to a certain number of truths.

There are two conceptions of the relations between China and the United States—the Chinese conception, and the American. In the general context of East and West, the Orient and the Occident, Asianism and western alliance, China reflects the Asian view, and America the western. For the West to piously dismiss the Peking Government's viewpoint, as if they were not entitled to one, because we in the West are convinced that our view is unalterably right, will only widen the gulf between the West and the East. What, after all, is the end which we all wish to achieve? It surely must be to progress in an atmosphere of security and peace. There is a strong tendency in the West to believe that our concept of progress is the right one, and that any other is, if not dangerous, at least a tiresome hindrance. This is inclined to engender a feeling among the western peoples that the Chinese leaders are being difficult, and there is a niggling belief that those leaders know that what they believe in is wrong, but are being cussed and wicked merely to exercise personal power. This is a dangerous misconception, but the common western man can hardly be blamed for believing such a thing when the whole process of western diplomacy with the Far East is keyed to that pitch.

It must be publicly and openly recognised, as U Nu has done recently, that the Chinese Communists believe absolutely that their political philosophy is right for the

situation as they see it, just as we in Britain are sure that our kind of political system is the only one within which our ideals can happily be brought to fruition. It should not come as a shock to find that western views and philosophy are largely alien to Asia. (Even in India, parliamentary democracy on the western pattern cannot be said to function very smoothly or comfortably.) We are too ready to assume that the political model we have to offer Asia at this time is undoubtedly the panacea for which they have been waiting.

It has been said that the situation over the United States airmen being tried as spies came about just at the time when President Eisenhower was beginning to steer opinion in the United States towards the idea of recognising that China, as a power, could not be for ever ignored. Gentler winds were said to be blowing. The pact that the United States recently made with Chiang Kai-shek was designed, so it is thought, to restrain any Nationalist adventure against the mainland, rather than to promote one. Reports have come from the United Nations headquarters and Moscow that the Russians were somewhat upset that the Chinese should have chosen such a time to aggravate the United States. But what, in fact, from the Chinese, indeed from the general Far Eastern, viewpoint does this mean? It means that when the United States says the cold war must ease, then it must ease; when America starts to think in terms of co-existence with China, then the world must flutter around in circles and see that the wish of Washington is not hindered in any way. When the US thinks the United Nations should condemn China in strong terms for her action over the airmen, then the United Nations does so. It is scarcely surprising that China should feel affronted by the axiom that "as goes the United States, so goes the world." Whether that axiom is a truth or not, is not the point. China thinks it is, and that is enough. China is a great power representing nearly a quarter of the world's population. She is a Communist country, but no one has yet proved that on the practical plane it has not meant an improvement in the lives of

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has moved to

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millions of Chinese. What matters in the present world situation is that she is an Asian nation, and the continued practice of the United States in leading the West in snubbing her and blocking her entry into the councils of the world plays on Asian susceptibilities and pride. Neither India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan nor the majority of the people of Malaya and Indo-China think that China should be treated as a pariah, but they think that the United States should not interfere in the situation between China and Formosa. This is important.

Asianism is a real concept. Why should it not be? Regional interests are common. In Europe we are interested in how the rearming of Germany affects us, the Africans and the Latin Americans worry less about it. The Bantu in South Africa have become, in their struggle for human rights, interested in what the Yoruba think in West Africa, or what the Kikuyu do in Kenya. In Asia the countries have something more than mutual interest; the process of ridding the East of western influence and interference is still going on, and Asians of different nationality, and often diverse outlook, are drawn together in this common cause. It is not only China that views with annoyance and alarm the use of American money in southern Viet Nam to bolster up a rule that is disliked and feared by the people. China is not the only Asian country to have repudiated the Manila treaty, and China is not alone in resenting American influence in Asia. The feeling against colonialism and racial differences among the Asian countries is very strong. The conference which has just met in Jakarta provides the proof, as does Mr. Nehru's concern over Cyprus, and the South-East Asian support for Indonesia in her claim for West Irian (Dutch West New Guinea).

Against this background it is by no means difficult to see how China feels. The fact that she has not been more intransigent, and completely ignored the United Nations' resolution and Mr. Hammarskjöld's request to visit Peking, is a measure of her desire to be, as far as she is able under the present circumstances, on the right side of the fence. She has every right to feel suspicious of American airmen flying over her territory, whether it was during the time of the Korean war or not. She probably feels that her right to detain them is as justified as the American right to detain Chinese students in the United States. At the time of the Spanish Civil War it was considered sensible and politic by the peaceful nations not to interfere until events decided which was the *de facto* government of the country. That principle should have applied to the civil war in China, and Delhi, Rangoon and Jakarta as well as Peking are right to show resentment that the power of the United States should have been brought in to support the faction which the people of China were anxious to be rid of.

The situation has got to a stage where it might be said that America's attitude to the Formosa question is the lynch-pin of peace and stability in Asia. Because many Americans are beginning a battle with their consciences about it, the views of Mr. Antony Nutting, British Minister of State, which were given on an American television programme, came at a particularly unfortunate time. To

let American audiences believe that Britain, who has been scrupulous to avoid getting tangled officially in the rights and wrongs of Formosa's position, would allow herself to become involved in a war in support of a discredited regime which she does not recognise, against a nation which she does, is an indefensible blunder which undermines the nation's confidence that he is able to present Britain's case accurately in the United Nations.

At this time when the nations of the East are beginning to take their places in equality beside those powers which have for so long held sway in the world, it would seem that western diplomacy is rashly shortsighted. If the position is to remain one of equality, and not in time to be one of oriental ascendancy, then the West ought to stop sowing the kind of diplomatic seeds that will grow into grievances. It is not difficult to see how policies could be framed without offending Asia, nor is it impossible for nations of different outlook to live side by side. The mistake the West makes is to assume that because she can no longer force the piper to play, she is nevertheless still entitled, by moral right, to call the tune.

Japanese Leanings

THE change of government in Japan reflects the influence which the relationship between America and China has upon the countries of Asia. Among the pressures and cross-currents that brought about the fall, or voluntary resignation, of Mr. Yoshida's Cabinet, were the twin desires of the people and business interests to lessen the influence of the United States in the direction of Japanese affairs, and to re-establish closer ties with Communist China. The caretaker government which has been formed under Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama is a hotch-potch whose main function is to prepare for elections in the early spring of this year.

For Japan to recognise the Peking regime and establish normal relations and trade with China it is necessary to overcome the opposition of the United States. There has already been talk of a cessation of economic aid from America if any such move was initiated. But it will remain to be seen which has the stronger appeal: American aid, or the prospect of finding a market for the increasing volume of Japanese consumer goods. The new government's declared policy of deflation at first met with approval, but on this particular issue there is conflict within the Cabinet between the Minister for International Trade and the Finance Minister.

Altogether, it seems that unless Mr. Hatoyama remains faithful to his original plan of making Japan independent of US political and economic influence, and of recognising China and establishing closer ties with the Soviet Union, his party, the Democrats, will not win the next elections. Again it is a question of pride and a country managing its own affairs. The electorate, rich and poor, know that their future must rely on their traditional contacts with China, rather than an invidious economic domination. The party that recognises this well enough to put it as a clear issue before the Japanese people, will head the next government in Japan.

Finance for India


THE formation of the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India is an important step towards the solution of a major Asian problem, namely the financing of the various development plans. While there are some indications of possible large-scale US Government investment in India and other Asian countries, they remain still rather vague, and the creation of the new Corporation is a concrete sign of not only greater international confidence in India's economy, but also a welcome indication of India's willingness to enter into close economic collaboration with abroad.

With an authorised capital of Rs. 25 crores (about £18,750,000) the Corporation should be able to extend substantial loans to private industry in India which will certainly result in a quicker and more expansive industrialisation of that country than was possible up to now. While Indian private investors are providing the bulk of the initial issue of share capital (about £2,650,000), investors in the UK will put up about £750,000 and subscribers in the US about £375,000. The Government of India will contribute a loan of approximately £5,625,000 and the International Bank of Reconstruction are expected to lend \$10m.

The participation of the UK subscribers has been arranged through the Commonwealth Development Finance Company (including insurance companies, eastern exchange banks and a number of industrial organisations) which

itself is one of the shareholders. But the most heartening sign has been the response of the three big heavy engineering companies, the English Electric Company Limited (Chairman, Sir George Nelson); Associated Electrical Industries Limited (Chairman, Lord Chandos) and the General Electric Company Limited (Chairman, Sir Harry Railing) who announced that they were joining the new Corporation to the extent of 1½ lakhs of rupees (£11,250) each. The significance of this announcement lies in the fact that these three prominent industrial concerns are taking part directly as foundation shareholders in the new Indian Corporation, in addition to their indirect shareholdings through the Commonwealth Development Finance Company. This augurs well for future Anglo-Indian economic relations, as this action on the part of these leading industrialists not only shows an interest in ready markets but also in the development of Indian industrialisation, and will be greatly appreciated in India.

The City is supporting the new scheme with experienced personnel as well as with funds. The present Steering Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, has appointed Mr. P. S. Beale, present chief cashier of the Bank of England, to become the first general manager of the new Corporation, and Mr. W. R. Cockburn, who has won international reputation as the general manager of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, is to be one of the British directors.



THE 'SCRUTABLE' CHINESE

ASIA IN WASHINGTON

By David C. Williams (Washington)

WHEN the new Congress convenes, one of its most important tasks will be to act upon a large-scale economic programme for help to the free nations of Asia. Following a number of "inspired" stories on the subject by journalists with access to off-the-record Administration sources, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made it official at a December Press conference. He said that proposals for economic aid have advanced "to the point where the principle is accepted," although there is as yet no agreement within the Administration about how to implement the new policy.

Explaining the reasoning behind the new policy, Dulles said that the Administration believes that "the present phase of the struggle" between the free world and Communism has shifted "more to economic competition" because there is less reason to fear open Communist aggression.

The Administration thus persists in its two-month-old peace offensive, in spite of the sentencing to long prison terms of eleven American airmen downed in China during the Korean War. This whole incident has been handled with great moderation and restraint, almost as if it were a blunder which the Communist Chinese committed inadvertently and as if they might rectify it any day.

Almost at its inception, the new policy was challenged by Senator Knowland, Republican majority leader in the past Senate, who claimed that "co-existence" was a Communist slogan intended to lull the free world into inaction until the Soviet Union had become so strong that it could move towards world domination. Most recently, Senator Joseph McCarthy, angered by his censure by his fellow-Senators and the Administration's approval of the rebuke, has challenged the President's new attitude in these terms:

"The President . . . urges that we be patient with the Communist hoodlums who, as of this very moment, are torturing and brainwashing American uniformed men in Communist dungeons.

"Anyone who knows the ABC's of the Communist war against free civilisation knows that weakness will not free a single one of these men."

In spite of Knowland and McCarthy, the Administration appears to have dropped old slogans like "massive retaliation." Like Churchill, the President seems to have come to the conclusion that, with Russia in possession of the hydrogen bomb, there is no real alternative to peace. The latest slogan to be buried was the much-publicised "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese mainland.

The burial took the form of the newly negotiated alliance between the United States and the Formosa Government. While the United States is formally committed, as it really always has been, to the defence of

Formosa and its essential island dependencies, it is definitely not committed to the defence of the various small islands such as Quemoy, which the Nationalists hold just off the mainland. Moreover, it is known that, in return for the alliance, Chiang Kai-shek was required to pledge once again that he would not launch an attack against the mainland without American permission.

The practical effect of the new agreement is to end any talk of "unleashing" the Nationalists and to re-neutralise Formosa. The function of the American Seventh Fleet is again what it was under Truman and Acheson, when its orders were both to protect Formosa from the mainland and the mainland from Formosa. Washington has finally concluded that the "unleashing" policy had become a liability rather than an asset. The time has passed when the Formosa "threat" relieved pressure on American arms in Korea and French arms in Indo-China. Instead, the "threat" was an invitation to the Chinese Communists to invade Formosa. By eliminating any real threat of a Nationalist attempt at invasion, Washington has sought to deprive the Communists of a provocation, or excuse, for action on their part.

If, as the Administration appears to hope, the present boundaries between the Communist and non-Communist worlds become stabilised, much will depend on whether economic progress among the free nations can out-pace that among the Communists.

One proposal which is being discussed is that of a fifteen-year aid programme for the under-developed areas of the world. Under this plan, something like four thousand million dollars or its equivalent might be made available each year. Some would be in the form of aid from the industrially advanced countries other than the United States; some in the form of private American capital, but a considerable portion, in the nature of the case, would have to be advanced in the form of loans and grants by the American Government.

Essential to the extension of any aid would be a realistic showing that the country concerned would really benefit by it—that it had proposals sufficiently practicable and worked out in adequate detail. Individual proposals, it is also felt, should be considered from the point of view of a long-term national plan.

Some countries, of course, may take a period of years to progress to the point where large-scale aid can usefully be applied. Others—and a prime example often cited here is India—are at that stage right now.

It is an ambitious scheme, but the experience of the Marshall Plan has shown that the American people can respond to a large proposal which captures their imagination more readily than to a small proposal which does not. And it is, of course, only a fraction of the sums now being spent upon armaments of all sorts.

HAS THE MANILA TREATY ANY VALUE?

By William Warbey, M.P.

THE criterion by which the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty is to be judged is whether or not it is likely to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the problems of South-East Asia, and of Asia and the Pacific generally. In this part of the world the global struggle between the Communist and anti-Communist power blocs is complicated by the revolutionary pressure of the movements for national independence and for social and economic advance. It would be surprising if this situation did not create the danger of violent outbreaks in the form of civil wars, anti-colonial wars and even international wars. All of these forms of violence have been illustrated in the post-war developments in China, Korea, Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China. Up to now, however, full-scale involvement of the Great Powers, almost certainly resulting in world war, has been averted, although at times by margins so narrow that, in the words of Nehru, mankind has escaped annihilation "by a hair's breadth." The problem which faces the statesmen of both East and West may therefore be expressed in this way: Can the revolutionary processes which are at work in Asia find fruitful expression without further violence and, at least, without dragging the world into war?

It goes without saying that this question will only be answered satisfactorily if the leaders of the Asian countries exercise restraint and if the leaders of the western countries show understanding and tolerance of change. Broadly speaking, it may be said that this formula has proved successful in the case of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and—after initial failures—Indonesia. Its application to Malaya has been too long delayed, but—given a few years' breathing space—it may succeed there too. Where it has failed—or rather has not been applied—is in the case of China, with Formosa, Korea and Indo-China. In these areas the possibility of peaceful evolution has been prejudiced by the complicating factor that the victory of the Chinese Communists brought a tremendous accession of potential strength to one of the two main power blocs which absorb so large a part of the world. The relationship between Communist China and the western countries has therefore become the key factor throughout the Asian and Pacific area. Until a relationship which is stable and mutually satisfactory has been achieved, no other problem in this area is likely to be settled solely on its own merits.

There is no need in this article to go over the whole ground of the divergence of views on this question which has arisen between Britain and the United States. The essential point is that Britain has accepted the Chinese People's Republic and, while keeping a watchful eye for signs of any *genuine* expansionist tendencies, is prepared to do business with the new China on the basis of "peaceful

co-existence." The United States, on the other hand, is torn between contradictory tendencies which seek on the one side to put the clock back and undo the Communist revolution completely, and, on the other side, to find a *modus vivendi* with the new China, in the hope of weaning her gradually from the Soviet bloc. The conflict between these two views within the United States and between the resultant official American policy and that of the British Government (itself under strong pressure from the Labour Opposition) has resulted in the extraordinary swings of policy which, during the past year have, at times, as at Geneva, produced a new mood of friendly cooperation and understanding, and at others, as during the battle at Dien Bien Phu, brought the world to the brink of catastrophe.

The Manila Treaty was conceived and born in the midst of these swings, and the infant, if it survives, will bear all the marks of compromise and contradiction. To the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments it is essentially an extension of the Anzus Pact, and yet at the same time it is not really that, because the American "Understanding" limits its effective application to "Communist" aggression and because the "treaty area," in any case, excludes Formosa and Japan. To the Americans it is, apparently, a means of opposing a ring of steel to further Communist advance in Asia, and yet it is hardly that, since there is no equivalent in it to NATO's military organisation and since each member state is free to decide for itself what action it shall take, if any, to meet a threat of Communist aggression. It is supposed to deal with the danger of Communist "subversion," and yet two of its signatories, Britain and France, are pledged to support the holding in Viet Nam of free elections which, on present evidence, are likely to bring Communist rule down to Saigon. Finally, the Treaty is intended to promote "economic progress and social well-being in the Asian countries," as a counter to Communism, and yet, because of its restricted Asian membership, it could only do that at the expense of the Colombo Plan and other schemes of a non-sectarian character.

From some points of view the Treaty might be regarded as a Charter of Metternichian counter-revolution, and no doubt it could so be used. It will certainly be regarded as such in China, and its existence will therefore be an obstacle to better relations between China and the West. Whether it will be used in practice as a counter-revolutionary instrument depends upon whether wise or foolish counsels prevail in Washington and London. Viet Nam may provide the test during the next two years.

From the military point of view the Treaty may well

prove valueless as a deterrent to the real potential sources of aggression in the Asian and Pacific area. The economic clauses will be positively dangerous unless they are virtually ignored. Politically the Treaty does the maximum amount of damage to the prospects for peaceful co-existence and harmonious development, without offering any compen-

sating advantage in the form of a rallying standard for those forces in Asia which seek to achieve their national and social aspirations by evolutionary and democratic means. The Manila Treaty contributes nothing to the real solution of the problems of this area. It would be better if it were quietly laid to rest and forgotten.

COMMUNISM'S S.E. ASIAN ALLIANCE

By Richard L. Butwell (Lexington, U.S.)

IT was in April that the United States and Britain announced that they had agreed to consider the possibility of establishing a South-East Asian collective security organisation. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in the months since then, have shown increasing interest in a strong anti-Communist alliance in this key area of the present-day world. Such a collective defence body now appears to be in the process of formation, the September conference in the Philippines having been to plan its establishment.

The West's attempt to organise to meet the Communist threat in this part of the world, however, comes nearly 30 years after the inauguration of liaison among the Communists themselves in the area. It was in 1926 that the Chinese Communist Party established a South Seas Committee, which a year later became the South Seas Communist Party, for the purpose of liaison with the revolutionary movements in the colonial region to the south of China. The Pan-Pacific Trade Union, which came into being in the same year, can be said to have had the same purpose. The apprehension in Singapore in 1930 of the Frenchman Joseph Ducroux, operating on behalf of the Comintern and the Profintern, indicated the extent of the activities of agents of the Third International in the area at that early date. It revealed, among other things, the existence in Shanghai of the Far Eastern Bureau and the direction it had been lending South-East Asian Communism.

This was more than 20 years ago. Conditions in South-East Asia in particular, and in the world in general, have changed tremendously in the period since then. The world has seen international Communism grow in strength, in Asia largely as a result of its triumph in China. It has also seen a lessening of the system of law and order in South-East Asia in the replacement of the colonial regimes by the new National Governments. It would seem almost absurd to suggest that, under such conditions, Communism could not, and would not, maintain at least as extensive links as it did two decades earlier.

The first known Red contact was that comprised by the South Seas Communist Party, the scope of operation of which included Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China and Indonesia (then the Netherlands East Indies). It had connections with Hong Kong, too—and looser ones with the Philippines and India. Dissolved in 1930, the SSCP was immediately succeeded by a new organisational structure, fulfilling, however, the old functions.

This new structure had two sections. One was the Malayan Communist Party, within which were sub-departments for Burma, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. The other was the Indo-Chinese Communist organisation, headed by Ho Chi Minh. If there were now two sections to the Communist network in South-East Asia, however, there was still a common directing hand. This was provided by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, which, in turn, came under the

supervision of the Far Eastern Bureau, with headquarters in Shanghai. It was the Chinese Communist-controlled Far Eastern Bureau which was the location of real power in the structure.

Communist liaison, however, was considerably disrupted by the detention of a number of leading Communists, including Ho Chi Minh, at the beginning of the 'thirties. But contacts were maintained throughout the decade, all evidence indicating the Pan-Pacific Trade Union provided the structure within which they functioned. The Communists' links were completely severed, though, by the Pacific war, with the result they have had, in many respects, to begin all over again in the post-war years.

There is considerable evidence that the liaison they have established since 1945 is much like the structure they employed in the 'thirties. The Asia-Australasian Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions, set up at the Chinese Communist-convoked Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in Peking in late 1949, is not much different from the Pan-Pacific Trade Union. That organisation had as its avowed purpose coordination of the efforts of Asia's proletariat through the central direction of the several Communist syndicates in the countries of East Asia. The Asia-Australasian Liaison Bureau, similarly, claims it intends to "develop and strengthen the ties between the trade union centres of these countries and the WFTU." Evidence is available, however, that the Pan-Pacific Trade Union not only engaged in considerable political activity but also served as the link between the various Communist parties of South-East Asia and Chinese Communism. There are indications, too, the Asia-Australasian Liaison Bureau is also a contestant in the arena of political activity and is, moreover, the main link to-day between Mao Tse-tung's Communists and the Communists of South-East Asia.

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that this is the extent of Communist liaison in South-East Asia to-day or that there are not rivalries within the network of Communist contacts. There are other connections—the links between China and the ten million South-East Asian Chinese is one of these—and there is at least one clear-cut struggle for power among the Communists themselves.

China's attempt to extend its influence in South-East Asia through the overseas Chinese is the most important of the other Communist links in the region. Mao Tse-tung is able to keep in contact with these overseas Chinese in a variety of ways. One means of his doing this is through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council, in which the overseas Chinese have 16 members by the Organic Law of China. In addition, in each South-East Asian country there are strong party cells which exist solely for the purpose of maintaining the loyalty of the overseas Chinese to China and, more important, to the

Chinese Communist Party. Considerable influence also is exercised through the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, an official government department, which includes many former Chinese residents of South-East Asia.

In addition to the above-mentioned liaison, there are also individual contacts between Peking and the various countries of the area. An example of such a contact is Malaya, where British officials, while not denying there are contacts between the "bandits" in Malaya's jungles and Communist China, claim that these are limited. They admit there is a courier system in operation between China and Malaya, which has run in the past, alternately, through Bangkok and Singora in Thailand. But they refuse to acknowledge the insurgents are receiving arms from outside the country—"at least not in appreciable numbers." Recently, a statement by an official government source indicated the transfer of the Malayan Communist Party headquarters to Sumatra, which, if true, means a new line of contact has been established.

The wholesale arrests of Chinese Communists in the Philippines in December, 1952, uncovered another direct link between Peking and a South-East Asian country, while contact also is known to exist between Burma's White Flag Communists and Peking. In late 1950, indeed, it was reported that the Burmese Communist leader Than Tun had signed an agreement with China, under which the Chinese were to supply arms and ammunition to the Burmese in return for the cession of a large part of Upper Burma and the use of Chinese aid according to the dictates of Mao's regional strategy. The agreement has yet to be implemented, however, except for small quantities of supplies.

The most clear-cut instance of direct Peking contact with a South-East Asian country is to be found in Viet Nam. China's Communists first trained and equipped Viet Minh forces in South China, then came to the further aid of Ho Chi Minh's rebels by performing these functions for them within Viet Nam. Yet, at the same time as they were receiving such aid from the Chinese, the Viet Minh leaders were themselves attempting to secure control over the less strong Communist movements in the adjacent South-East Asian countries—this in rivalry with Peking itself. An action to be expected was the Joint National Front in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, announced in 1951. The other nationalist movements in South-East Asia—and the Viet Minh struggle is a nationalist as well as Communist one—followed the boundaries established by the colonial powers, and it is thus no oddity that Ho should think of Indo-China as representing a political unity worthy of his aspirations. It is when his relationship with Thailand and Burma, as well as the other South-East Asian lands, is considered that the prospect of Viet Minh-Chinese rivalry emerges.

The first indication of Viet Minh intentions in this regard was the establishment, by Ho's agents, of the South-East Asia League in Bangkok in September, 1947. Announced as officers of this body were Nai Tiang Sirikhand, Thai legislator and former Deputy Minister of Interior, president; Viet Minh agent Tran Van Giau, vice president; Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Communist Free Laos Movement (recently accorded two enclaves in Laos by the Geneva agreement), secretary; and Le Hi, editor of the *Viet Nam News*, then published in Bangkok, treasurer. A manifesto said the League aimed at "the achievement of a unity among the various peoples of South-East Asia which will eventually be of such tangible and substantial nature that official recognition will be accorded it by organisation of a Federation of South-East Asia."

The real intentions of the League's organisers were not

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announced. Van Giau had come to Thailand in 1945 for the sole purpose of organising Reds and fellow travellers under Viet Minh leadership. Paralleling the overt activities of the League was the supply of the Viet Minh with arms and other forms of aid.

The League was eclipsed very shortly after its formation, however, by the return of Phibun Songkram to power in Thailand. Although the League passed out of existence with Phibun's return, this was not the case with the broader project of Viet Minh hegemony over South-East Asian nationalism or Communism. This remained, its organisational form becoming a body known in Thailand by its abbreviated title of Ku-Sap Be, the translation of the full name of which means "Liberation Party for the Salvation of the Fatherland: Viet Nam-Laos-Cambodia-Thailand-Burma." Founded in 1944, before the Japanese departed, the Ku-Sap had as its father Moscow-trained Nguyen Van Long, a Tonkinese. In Thailand, it has been claimed, though not conclusively proved, that the "Manhattan Affair" revolt of June, 1951, led by Lieutenant Commander Manas, against the Phibun regime was in fact a Ku-Sap revolt.

Van Long, however, had long been absent from Bangkok at the time of the 1951 revolt. His departure was no doubt precipitated, like that of Van Giau, by the advent of Phibun to power. He is claimed to have gone to Burma, where he set up an organisation known as the "Executive Committee of the People's Liberation Armies of South-East Asia." Location of the headquarters of this body was reported to be in Mon Len in Eastern Burma. Later, an organisation called the "Central Committee of the Laodong (the Vietnamese Communist Party) to the Peoples of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia" was

reported to have set up headquarters, under Van Long, in Mongpong in the Shan States in Burma.

This brief summary does not exhaust the list of Red contacts in to-day's South-East Asia, though it does indicate the main ones. It omits, for example, discussion of the present directives prescribing the programme of the Communist Parties of Indonesia, Malaya and Burma—directives which call for limitation of the armed struggle at the present time and an emphasis on political penetration. Just six weeks separate the Malayan and Burmese directives, issued in 1951, while Indonesia's Communists received their instructions in 1952. Additional evidence of the common line pursued by South-East Asia's Communists is to be found in their newly adopted programmes of greater peasant support. This line was adopted at the reorganisation of the Indonesian Communist Party in October, 1953, for example, while in March the Thai Red leadership called for greater effort in gaining peasant support.

Mention is omitted, too, of Moscow's direct role in the region. This is because there is virtually no indication of such activity on the part of the Soviet Union in South-East Asia to-day. However, there is considerable evidence to indicate

Russian sponsorship of the Calcutta Youth Conference in 1948, at which the call for open revolt in South-East Asia was sounded. After 1948, particularly following the Peking-convened Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in 1949, Communist leadership in Asia clearly passed to China.

The Communists, thus—as has been indicated—can be seen to have cooperated in South-East Asia for nearly 30 years now. In this regard they enjoy somewhat of an advantage over the West, which has pursued a divided policy in this region most of this time. At the same time, although the Communists' South-East Asian "organisation" is an older one, it is one in which various stresses and strains are to-day evident. Red China now appears to head the camp of the South-East Asian Communists, but Ho's Viet Minh, however, is seriously competing with Peking for leadership in the area, while India's Communists, inactive in the region except for Burma, could play a more active role in the future. Moscow, which has acquiesced in Peking leadership since 1948, might show more interest in the area in the years ahead, too. There are, it would seem, strains, actual and potential, in Communism's South-East Asian "alliance"—despite the 30 years it has been in existence.

THE FUTURE OF BRITAIN'S ASIAN COLONIES

By R. W. Sorensen, M.P.

DESPITE angry criticism directed against the late Sir Stafford Cripps for desiring the "liquidation" of the British Empire, in fact most of it was liquidated when India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma won their freedom and independence. And as and when the Gold Coast and Nigeria achieve the same status there will not be much left of "Empire." Some find nostalgic consolation in referring to the "British Commonwealth and Empire" but certainly Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese do not accept the designation of "British" and emphasise that their countries are members of the "Commonwealth of Nations."

Nevertheless, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, British North Borneo and Hong Kong represent the remaining Asian colonial areas of the British Empire. Indeed, alone among western powers the United Kingdom retains extensive Asian possessions, for one-time Dutch Indonesia is now a Republic, so are the Philippines, and French Indo-China has been truncated. How long could or should British Asian territories remain in their present category?

If a further question is why and how those territories remain British the broad answer is that by its wisdom British policy has secured greater confidence from Asian peoples than have the policies of other powers, and that this has been fortified by its statesmanship in respect of India and her neighbours.

This does not overlook the significance of what is called the "Emergency" in Malaya, where for eight years resources have been severely strained in dealing with a violent attempt by "CTs" (i.e. "Communist Terrorists" in official terminology) to "liberate" Malaya. Of over 7,000 CTs killed, surrendered or captured 90 per cent. were

Chinese, and probably 98 per cent. of the 5-6,000 still operating are Chinese. All races, however, apart from the diminishing CT recruits, appear anxious for the Communist venture to end. Although it is failing, complete collapse will not be immediate. Meanwhile constitutional activity for Malayan self-government or independence gathers strength.

Recently I was able, together with four colleagues, to gather first-hand impressions of Malayan life and problems by a tour under the auspices of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and such previous knowledge as I possessed was illuminated invaluable. In particular I was heartened by the efforts being made in a multi-racial society to secure inter-racial social and political action and a deeper sense of common Malayan citizenship. The success of this could generate an exhilarating spirit of service and social reconstruction as a positive answer to the tragic futility of the CTs.

Politically, it is encouraging that an Alliance exists between the United Malay National Organisation and the Malayan Chinese Association. This finds unity on the single purpose of independence, and although its adversaries predict it will not last long after the coming elections, time may prove otherwise. There is also a non-communal Party Negara, or National Party, with a published detailed programme, such as the UMNO-MCA Alliance does not as yet possess; a Progressive Party in Singapore; the Pan-Malayan Labour Party, struggling valiantly against great difficulties; and the Malayan Indian Congress, which may also join the Alliance. These parties all serve to educate the Malayan electorate.

It is essential to remember that with the exception of the British Settlements of Penang and Malacca, Malaya

historically has been subject to Sultanates and that the present Sultans are recognised as rulers within their States by virtue of treaties negotiated in the 19th century. I am persuaded that for racial and Islamic reasons they retain considerable influence. The pre-war Federated and Unfederated Malay States, together with the Settlements, now form the Federation of Malaya, with Singapore, previously part of the Straits Settlements, as a separate administrative entity.

The Sultans have their own State Councils, but have transferred most of their legislative and executive powers to the Federal Government which will have 46 non-elected and 52 elected members plus the filling of five "reserve" nominations by the High Commissioner after consultation with the leader of the majority party elected. Electors will be on a common roll based on voluntary registration of those fulfilling certain residential qualifications, although there is still criticism that it is too restrictive.

This is an encouraging advance towards the goal of independence, but I found some ambiguity as to whether or when "independence" involved complete responsibility for defence and foreign affairs. Logically and ultimately this may be implicit but unlikely to become explicit until the prospective Legislative Council has been well established. In the new constitution of Singapore there is to be a Legislative Council of 25 members out of 32. Both in Malaya and Singapore there will be Executives subject to the High Commissioner and Governor respectively.

Out of the population of 5,700,000 in Malaya 2,800,000 are Malays, 2,200,000 Chinese, 650,000 Indians and 80,000 other races. Of Singapore's 1,100,000 people, Chinese number 860,000, Malays 140,000, Indians 90,000 and others 40,000. Malays therefore are in a slight minority in Malaya and much more so in Malaya and Singapore combined. These races are distinctive, and this became even more obvious when I journeyed to the eastern coast where the great majority are Malays in gaily coloured head-dress and sarongs.

Mohammedism is strong among the Malays, while the extremely industrious Chinese are nominally Buddhists, with an admixture of other religious elements in both cases. The Indian Tamil rubber-tappers are mostly Hindu as their temples near the plantations indicate. Colour prejudice in Malaya would be ludicrous, and it is a pity Dr. Malan could not have accompanied us on our tour for the sake of spiritual health!

Economically rubber is almost a synonym for Malaya, and without it not only would Britain lose a precious dollar-earner but the country would be a great deal poorer. Synthetic rubber manufactured in the United States and Germany is a formidable competitor, but I was assured that with enterprise and efficient cultivation the prospects of natural rubber remained good. In total acreage the estates are slightly greater than the small-holdings, but in production in 1953 the former produced 341,117 tons, compared with the 231,675 tons from the latter. The necessities of grafting and replanting, with new trees maturing only after seven years, alone make it improbable

that small-holders, unless they cooperate, can keep pace with capital and other requirements.

Tin, timber, pineapple, coconut and other products also contribute to the economy, but far-sighted planning is imperative if the total wealth of the country is to provide a higher standard of life. The demand for education is incessant, and while the many Chinese schools testify to zealous Chinese benefactions they are not always of the highest standard. A comprehensive primary and secondary educational service and ampler health and other social services are urgent needs, even if the severe burden of combating CTs continues.

Trade unionism is being rebuilt and now has about 16,000 members, disproportionately Indian. This is much less than before the Emergency began when many Communist trade union officers withdrew to the jungle to initiate the insurrection. Wages are low, and the increases secured lag behind rising prices. But while working-class living standards should be greatly improved and while legitimate criticism has been levelled against large profits made in Malaya and partially drawn by overseas investors, according to Dr. Victor Purcell the national income in 1949 was estimated at \$3,069m., of which \$47m. was paid abroad, and that the remaining \$3,022m. gave a per capita income of \$498 or £58 compared with £227 in the UK for the same year. A basic necessity is therefore to increase the national wealth. The resolution and courage of plantation managers, workers and trade union officials in the face of constant ruthless intimidation is impressive, and this spirit can have striking economic results if translated through inter-communal cooperation and an effective social and political policy.

In Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei circumstances are different. Signs of Communist activity are slight, and echoes of Indonesian nationalism from the non-British three-quarters of Borneo are very faint. Sarawak has passed from the dynastic control of the White Rajah Brookes into British Colonial administration. There the ex-head-hunting Dayaks pursue their now peaceful ways, and Dayaks, Malays and other peoples dwell together with, apparently, enough to eat, and little to disturb them. In North Borneo, as with other parts of the area I visited, there are tragic memories of the Japanese occupation, but steady reconstruction and social rehabilitation proceeds.

It is little Brunei, with its 45,000 people compared with Sarawak's 600,000 and North Borneo's 340,000 which supplies a startling contrast. The Sultan in Council has determined that \$100m. shall be set aside for the upbuilding of a paternal Welfare State, with pensions for all at 60 years, and for the blind and disabled; allowances for orphans and other dependants; free meals for children, free expanded education and medical services; better communications; an aircraft runway and much else. All because of abundant oil at Seria. Whether such bountiful blessings will soundly nourish Democratic consciousness is conjectural.

Such a paradox may excite the envy of its poor neighbours, and is liable to stimulate resistance to any talk of closer association, at least among the Bruneians. Yet

it may be possible that Brunei and His Highness will not be averse to providing educational, medical and other facilities for those less fortunate neighbours.

Finally, there is Hong Kong, which, like Singapore, has been built by British enterprise on barren rock. It is now a thriving, congested city of two-and-a-half million people compared with the half a million remaining when the Japanese withdrew. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have poured in from China, but the Communist bookshops and newspapers are evidence both of political liberty and of the very mixed political elements living cheek by jowl. There is a vast "squatters" problem aggravated by intermittent fires, and although the municipality is energetically tackling the housing problem its task remains immense. There is also unemployment in Hong Kong, but notwithstanding the embargo on certain exports to China, there are thousands of workers employed in a variety of new and old workshops and factories. Thirty miles away at the frontier between Communist China and the New Territories, leased for 100 years from China in 1899, armed guards impassively face each other. They provide a reminder not only of past British achievement in this enclave into the Chinese mainland but also of the fate of that other enclave of Shanghai.

There is no democratic representation in the Hong

Kong Legislature, the reason being the prevailing complex social conditions of what is in these days a Far East anachronism.

How long these six diverse British territories will remain as they are, or how otherwise they will develop can only be speculative. It does not necessarily mean they will pass from the British orbit or that drastic changes will take place in the near future. Malaya and Singapore will probably transcend their social pluralism and advance towards membership of the Commonwealth. It may be in due course these areas will federate with the three in Borneo, although that time is not yet, and preliminary closer association of British Bornean areas may first have to be explored. And as for Hong Kong—?

What is desirable is that social and political education and responsibilities shall be greatly expanded and adequate economic assistance to raise the standard of life shall be systematically provided. The success of these may so infuse what is now the British Far East with a sense of true democratic values as will ensure its liberation from poverty, ignorance, disease, apathy and social sterility more effectively and demonstrably than by other means employed elsewhere. This will go far to vitiate influences from behind the Bamboo Curtain and make a constructive contribution to world peace.

HINDUISM AND COMMUNISM: ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?

By Taya Zinkin (Bombay)

INDIA has none of the preconditions of Communism, except poverty. Nothing in the historical, social and religious background of India is really in favour of the spread of Communism. This, however, does not mean that India could not go Communist. It can, easily, if the Five Year Plans fail; not, however, otherwise. If the Plans fail and the Indian standard of living goes down with every new baby, then even revolution will lose its terror and religion will be swept aside; but every non-totalitarian alternative will be tried first.

If one looks at the history of Communism one sees how little natural appeal it has for India. Communism is a very German doctrine both in its belief that life can be fitted into the categories of a philosophy and in its belief in force. Marx, Engels, Hegel, the founders, and the philosophic inspiration of Communism are German. Even Lenin had been brought up on German culture, reinforced by the strong impact upon all European intellectuals of the French Revolution and of the tradition of Revolutionary terror which has found its expression in Russia in Nihilism. This is not the case in India, where there is a definite allergy to the use of force. The Hindu way of life and worship is anything but rigid, and the impact of the French Revolution has been even fainter than on England, for, unlike the Chinese and the Russian intellectuals who all went to the Continent to study, the Indian intellectuals went to Oxford or Cambridge, where they acquired the British love of

sports, compromise and that intellectual laziness which deters Britons from ploughing through the stodgy Communist literature which Continentals devour. Perhaps even more than in England, the traditional way of bringing about change is to prefer programmes to doctrines, to replace impractical idealism by cool empiricism. In China, the intellectual tradition was always Confucian, and Confucius is a thinker very much on Communist lines who subordinates everything to the State and its servants who alone are capable of deciding what is good for the masses. It requires little mental revolution for a Coral Buttoned Mandarin to become a Commissar. The make-up of the intellectual in India is quite different.

Indeed in India, the intellectual, unhappy though he sometimes is, has no fundamental grievance. The shift of power which has already taken place has been a shift from the Princes, the landlords and the British to the intellectuals and the middle class who now provide the country with its administration and its politicians. Those who matter in India now are two or three generations from some small peasant who valued education for his sons: Gandhi's grandfather was a small man, so was Nehru's, and many senior Civil Servants are either schoolmasters' sons or the grandsons of small cultivators. Indeed there is in India the same upward fluidity as in the United States; therefore Revolution for power is not as attractive as it has been in feudal or bourgeois societies like Germany, Russia or France.

Moreover, in India the democratic tradition is deep-rooted in village and caste councils. There have never been serfs in India as in Russia until 1861 or Germany until the beginning of the 19th century. There has never been in India that sheer oppression by the landlord which the breakdown of the Manchu Empire made possible in China; land was in India a legal quantity, the disposal of which had to be referred to laws enforced by the British regime, often in a misconceived fashion but never arbitrarily, redress was always possible.

It is against this background that one must look at the relations between religious fervour and the attractions of Communism. In Russia, religious fervour was on the decline: fakes like Rasputin had done much to discredit the Church amongst the educated, and Tolstoy had, like Voltaire in France, done much to promote individual reassessment of moral values. In China, religious fervour had died already—if it ever existed—for had there been, true religious fervour, Chiang, a Christian, would never have had the support he got in his heyday. Indeed, instead of God, Confucius had given China a code of good manners not altogether dissimilar from Mr. Dale Carnegie's art of making friends and influencing people. Communism itself, of course, regards religion as the opium of the masses.

India, on the other hand is steeped in its religion. It is perhaps even more religious than the United States. Moreover, Hinduism is a creed of tolerance. Hinduism provides the illiterate villager with a way of life which satisfies his needs and it also provides the educated with a philosophy which he can reconcile with his belief in the need for a modern outlook. Thus Mr. Rajagopalachari points out that "Civilisation in modern times has identified itself with man's control over his environment. In the pursuit of this objective it has forgotten the prime requisite for happiness—control over oneself. The attempt to control the minds of men and women as if they were raw material like coal and iron took shape in Hitlerism and Communism. Restraint should be developed from within in accordance with truth to replace the restraints imposed by the State. When regulations lose the governance of moral values and when indoctrination is deemed lawful there is loss of freedom." Unlike most religions, Hinduism has no priesthood, therefore there is no need for the orthodox to revolt against the orthodox as in, say, Israel. The

Hindu priest is a mere temple attendant who unravels the ritual for a consideration and holds no place in society. The real heads of the Hindu religion are either Vedantic scholars who live in monasteries much like the medieval monks, or ascetics who give up everything to meditate and try to attain Nirvana. Both the Hindu Scriptures and the ascetics stress the value of renunciation and preach the bringing to perfection of the individual soul by humility and detachment. Moreover, Hindus are allergic to proselytism and to this extent less attracted to Communism than Christians who believe they must look after the salvation of their brethren. Hindu detachment comes from the belief that man pays in this life for past sins and that to interfere with this is to interfere with the ways of God. Moreover, before taking action, the Hindu must be 100 per cent. sure that he is in the right—this comes out clearly in the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna in the *Bhagavad Gita*—Arjuna the soldier will fight only after he has been completely convinced by Krishna his maker that it is his duty to fight. This need for moral certitude must paralyse revolutionary action in the believer, particularly since life is never 100 per cent. black and white, it is always full of greys. Finally, since the ascetic, not the Pope, or the King, is the ideal to strive to emulate, power as such, material success as such, is less attractive. Indeed, in the 20th-century India, the big industrialist is despised, the Saint honoured, and over two-thirds of Mr. Nehru's appeal to the masses comes from the fact that "he has sacrificed everything, given away his wealth and spent many years in jail" as so many villagers explain. Thus the very basic factor which spikes the wheels of progress in India, namely the lack of worldly ambitions, is its major bulwark for stability.

The stability of India is however at the mercy of the realities of life; religion and renunciation cannot for ever fill stomachs and in a shrinking world the progress of the West, rather than the progress of the East, is going to submit Indian society to tremendous pressures. India is trying through its Plans to give each man the hope of a better future for his children, for he knows that this hope is not a wild dream—elsewhere it is a reality—but if the democratic way fails—and it will be tried till its breaking point has been passed—India will go Communist with a bang, for no one is more desperate than he who has had hope and lost it.

SHOOTING WAR IN MALAYA CONTINUES

By Paul S. Markandan (Singapore)

I HAVE just returned from a three-month tour of Malaya, during the course of which I have covered well over 20,000 miles by air, road and river.

The fight against the Communists in Malaya is now in its seventh year. When the Emergency was declared, the estimated number of Communists under arms was between five and six thousand. Up to the end of 1953, the number of terrorists captured or killed totalled 5,300. When General Templer left Malaya in June last year, he

estimated the number under arms, at that time, at between five and six thousand. From these facts, the observer wonders if any progress has been made towards the end of the Emergency. No one seems to know when the Emergency will be over, and to all intents and purposes it may go on for another five or ten years, all the time sapping the country's resources.

Forty-eight per cent. of the country's expenditure is being utilised in the maintenance of the police force, the

Federation and Malay Regiments. A notable sum has been spent on the resettlement programme, and a considerable amount is directed towards the maintenance of Emergency staff.

The Emergency in Malaya has continued for so long that it has become a part of the Malayan scene. A murder or an ambush does not appear as abnormal, and even the local Press has reduced most Emergency items to a single paragraph in small type. There is a sense of frustration amongst the people and high officials, all the more magnified in view of the political awakening of the country.

The Malayan Communist Party appears to be strongly rooted, and its organisation is directed by men who must have a deep knowledge of the country and its people. Under the Central Committee of the MCP are State Committees which are divided into District Committees. Each District Committee is split into Branch Committees. Up to the State Committee level, the members perform more administrative work, and are all party members with about ten years or more service to the party. Most of them have the rank of commissars. At this level is the fighting force, known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the Armed Workers Force (AWF) and the Min Yuen.

In each Branch there are mass executives, whose work is to indoctrinate the masses and organise sympathisers' cells. A recruit to the party has to serve a minimum of four years in one of these cells, to prove his loyalty to the MCP. His work is largely confined to collecting food and passing on information.

Most of the Communists killed, captured or surrendered are rarely above the rank of District Committee Member, so that the hard core of the MCP are continuing their work.

Under the resettlement plan, approximately 600,000 squatters have been resettled in new villages surrounded by two perimeter fences ten feet apart and about six to eight feet in height. At night the area outside the perimeter fence is illuminated by arc lights. Each night there is a curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. the following morning. Every man and woman who leaves the village to go to the rubber estate to tap rubber, or on any other pretext, is supposed to be carefully searched by security forces. Yet food and information is still going to the terrorists from these same villages on which millions of dollars has been spent.

Admittedly, the quantity of food reaching the Communists from these villages is less than in previous years. On the other hand the executives of the MCP will find it very much easier to carry on their process of indoctrination in these new villages. Here, the people are grouped together, and are thus more easily reached than when they were living in isolated huts on the jungle fringe.

My suggestion that there are Communist cells in these villages and in most towns, has never been denied by Special Branch Officers. In fact, many agreed on that point. The terrorists today are not as static as they were in previous years. They are constantly on the move through the jungle. The quality of their fighting force has been reduced by the new recruits, on whom little time is spent in training. But numerically, they appear to be just

as strong as they were in 1951. To illustrate their method of operation, I quote an incident which took place recently in an oil palm estate in South Johore. Readers will remember that Mr. C. Shawcross, Q.C., escaped, or rather, his life was spared by the terrorists in this estate. At that time the manager of the estate was killed.

Following this, the Communists killed the Indian conductor of the same estate in his house. This particular man has five dogs, two of which are fierce Alsations. His house is surrounded by wire mesh. On this day, he was celebrating his daughter's birthday with a party to which he had invited his friends. He had chained the dogs to prevent them from biting the guests. It was raining heavily and the party was well under way.

About 30 terrorists surrounded the house and the leader of the platoon entered the house, called for the man by his name, and shot him. Then, they left. The question is—how did these terrorists know that he was having a party and that the dogs would be chained? Who gave them the information? They must have had an informer in that estate. This is not an isolated incident, for there have been scores of others, which clearly shows that their intelligence system is efficient.

The authorities on the other hand, did very little to strengthen the security system in that area even after the murder of the estate manager. Kulai new village and Paloh, both of which are in Johore, have been known to be the stronghold of the Communists since the commencement of the Emergency. They still retain that position. Who is responsible for this? Does this suggest that the security forces are unable to maintain law and order in that area?

The states of Johore, Pahang, Selangor and Perak have provided the hideouts for the Communists for the past seven years, and still continue to do so. Certain districts in these states have been declared "white" (free of bandit activity) but the concentration in the other districts has increased, and the villagers in such districts face the brunt of the Communist brutality. Rather than not cooperate with the Communists and be killed, they do what the terrorists ask them to do. Their only security is a handful of policemen with an inadequate supply of arms and ammunition. Can the government blame these people who are caught between two fires, for cooperating with the Communists, when proper security is not provided?

General Bourne, who is the present Director of Operations, said some time back that the word Emergency was misleading, and should be called a rebellion. Many civil officers opposed this. This is the basic problem in this country today—many choose not to face facts, if these are unpalatable. The sooner the government realises that the present Communist menace in Malaya is a planned rebellion and treat it as such, the sooner will there be peace. Whether it is inspired by a few thousands or otherwise, the masses in the rural areas are to a large extent dominated by them, thus giving greater numerical support to the MCP. So far, all attempts at severing this link between the MCP and the villagers has not succeeded, as was initially expected. As long as this link exists, the terrorists cannot be starved out of the security of the jungle.

ASIAN DIPLOMATS IN LONDON

Nguyen Khac Ve

THE Geneva compromise between Asian independence and western security gives to the state of Viet Nam a tentative legitimacy until July, 1956. At the moment, without any form of consultation or cooperation with the people, three separate authorities—the USA, France and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, nominated by Bao Dai, Head of State—are trying to sort out their relative weight among themselves and in the country's affairs. Such a situation is a test for any diplomat charged with elucidating abroad the condition of his country.

Dr. Nguyen Khac Ve, as Minister of Viet Nam, has this delicate mission in London. Anything he is prepared to say must of necessity sail between the Scylla of complete diplomatic vacuity and the Charybdis of criticism of the authority to which he owes his appointment.

Born in 1896, Nguyen Khac Ve was sent to France to study when he was only eleven. He stayed there for fifteen years, and returned home, with doctorates in law and political economy, to begin to practise law. In 1923 he was appointed judge of a French Court in Cochin China (South Viet Nam), a position in all respects equivalent to that of a French judge. He held it for 25 years, till the post-war whirlwind swept him out of his settled niche into higher posts.

In General Nguyen Van Xuan's Government of Cochin China, Dr. Ve was in 1947 appointed Minister of Justice. This province was the most prized of France's colonial possessions in Indo-China, and formed the base for French military action against Ho Chi Minh. In the following year General Xuan rose to be Prime Minister of the Central Provisional Government of Viet Nam, and Dr. Ve became his Minister of Justice in Saigon. He retained this portfolio through the four successive administrations presided over by His Majesty Bao Dai (1949), Nguyen Phan Long (1950), and Tran Van Huu (1950 and 1951). In the second Government of Huu, Dr. Ve was also Deputy Premier. Then the fifth governmental change in 1952 lost him his place in the cabinet, and he was sent to represent the country in London.

His survival as Minister of Justice through so many governments is conclusive evidence of the high regard in which he is held in Saigon. It also suggests that he carries

little influence in the political factions of his country; in the struggle for power and favour, the Saigon politicians were clearly little affected by his interests.

Madame Khac Ve, like the Minister himself, was educated in France, and holds the French diploma of *Brevet Supérieur*. At home the family is bi-lingual, speaking French as spontaneously as their mother-tongue Vietnamese. Dr. Ve is the author of a book entitled *Le Problème Franco-Germanique*, published in 1947.

The couple have been married for 25 years and have six

children, who are attending schools and colleges in France, Britain and America. All have good prospects. Dr. Ve therefore accepts with considerable equanimity the losses he has incurred at the hands of the nationalists. His father's property of 1,200 hectares of the best rice-growing land in Cochin China was the basis of a prosperous home life, and made possible the expensive education of himself and his two brothers. The family fortunes remained unimpaired by the world war, but the seven years' war against Ho Chi Minh has cost them dear. The land, houses, and orchards, and the herds of cattle and buffalo which Dr. Ve inherited, have all gone. In this supposed

stronghold of Bao Dai and French colonialism, the peasant followers of Ho Chi Minh took over the land and animals, while houses and orchards were destroyed in the course of the fighting.

Dr. Ve's chief regret is for the loss of the orchards and a large collection of china vases, because they were things of beauty. He declares he has no objection to the land passing into the possession of its tillers. Not that there is any reason to suppose the Minister favours radical social changes. If the Saigon Government acquires sufficient strength and stability, he is not likely to refuse to return to the proprietorship of his lost land. He does not, however, harbour bitterness against the peasants who dispossessed him, and is quite resigned to the possibility of the dispossession being a permanent one.

As the representative of the country south of the 17th Parallel, Dr. Ve necessarily expresses the views of his government. But the most striking thing about him is his ardent pride in his country, symptomatic of the new Asian nationalism.



THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM (II)

By Le Thanh Khoi

AGRARIAN REFORM

THE People's Army in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is made up almost entirely of peasant elements. The peasantry also plays the leading role in the national economy since 85 per cent. of the population are occupied with rice growing; the agrarian problem has been a major preoccupation of the Republic.

Before the war, South Viet Nam was a country of large landowners : 2.5 per cent. of the population possessed 45 per cent. of the soil ; small owners an average of 2 hectares. In North and Centre Viet Nam there were many small holdings, but each family (of about five persons) had only an average of 0.50 hectare.

In September, 1945, in order to increase the production threatened by the flooding of Red River and then by drought, the government launched a nation-wide campaign for the utilisation of all arable areas : "Not an inch of unproductive land," "not an unproductive arm" was the slogan. An order of November 15 decreed the compulsory renting out of fallow lands. In November, 1947, a new decree granted every citizen who asked for it 3 hectares of fallow land belonging to the State with the condition that he tilled them. After two years the land would become his property.

A first general legislation was promulgated in July, 1949. The rent rate was reduced by 25 per cent., and the tenant now enjoys the following guarantees : the tenancy must be for at least three years ; in case of cession of leased land, the new landlord cannot exact restitution by the tenant. Usury is also regulated in order to prevent the landlords, who accepted the reduction of land rent, to make up for their losses by forcing their debtors to pay usury interest. The rate of interest in money and paddy is fixed and compound interest forbidden. Debts for which the interest paid amounts to twice the original loan are cancelled. Loans made by traitors or contracted by poor peasants who died for the Fatherland are cancelled. The paying of debts contracted with absentee landlords or by peasants in the army, and victims of war or natural scourges, is postponed. Finally, the government temporarily distributed lands belonging to "French colonialists and Vietnamese traitors."

However, these reforms came up against a veiled and stubborn opposition from the landlords who still held the political power in the villages. For their part, the peasants were too ignorant and unorganised to assert their rights effectively. And in fact the necessity for national union in the struggle for independence did not allow the government to strongly repress breaches of the law.

In 1953, after the strengthening of Republican power, the government took a decisive step. A first decree was promulgated on April 12, laying down the retroactive

reduction of rents and rates of interest, and mobilising the peasantry in view of its application. But this proved insufficient. The National Assembly met from December 1 to 4, 1953, and voted an agrarian reform law which was promulgated by Ho Chi Minh on December 19. This entailed that lands belonging to French and Vietnamese landlords without exception, as well as communal lands, were to be distributed among poor peasants who had no lands or not enough. The livestock and agricultural instruments were also to be distributed. The landlords who had not fought the resistance were to be indemnified in public bonds redeemable in 10 years. Finally, all rural debts were cancelled.

This was a radical reform. Its object was explained by Ho Chi Minh in an address to the Assembly. He forecast the following consequences :

1. From the military viewpoint the peasants would take a more active part in the Resistance movement.
2. From the political viewpoint, the political and economic power in the countryside would be in the peasants' hands ; the Unified National Front (*Lien Viet*) would become larger and more powerful.
3. From the economic viewpoint, the peasants, once rid of the heavy feudal exploitation, would increase their production, which in turn would stimulate the whole economy and improve the standard of living.
4. From the social and cultural viewpoint, the great majority of the people, having enough food and clothing, would be able to develop the best elements of Vietnamese culture and traditions.

Thus the agrarian reforms aimed at assuring the victory of the resistance, while victory over the enemy would ensure the success of the agrarian reform. All the other tasks would be coordinated around these two tasks, centred on them and serve them.

FINANCE AND ECONOMY

The first objective of the Republic was to increase the production (*Tang gia san xuat*). Without a regular supply, without an appropriate level of provisions for the population, the protracted resistance was impossible. The most important problem is that of rice. Before the war rice production in North Viet Nam was barely sufficient to feed the population. The peasants' task to-day is to protect dykes, to enlarge the arable area by irrigation works, construction of canals, etc. They are helped by a system of cooperative stores and mutual aid teams, and stimulated by competitions of patriotic emulation.

The Republic controls many mining resources. All mines have been nationalised : coal, antimony, tin, zinc, tungsten, lead, phosphate, sulphur, gold, etc.. They are mostly in North Viet Nam, and in part exploited.

The industrial effort bore principally on the munitions industry. A more and more important domestic production made up for Chinese aid, arms taken in the battlefield or imported from Thailand, the Philippines, Macao, Hong Kong, etc. Hundreds of workshops were scattered from the north to the south, always carefully camouflaged.

Apart from the munitions industry, there are textile industries, traditional food industries (distilleries, rice mills, pickle mills, sugar refineries), and a rather important paper and printing industry, because the administrations, the political organisations and the Press are big consumers.

How was the war effort financed? The budgetary returns come from taxes and loans. During the war, the principal tax was a tax on rice. Its rate was progressive according to the quantity harvested, less an abatement on the basis of the same for all. This abatement was increased from 60 kilograms per son in 1951 to 81 kilograms in 1953, thus lightening the taxpayer's burden. Taxation was not sufficient. The government resorted to varying forms of loan in kind or in money, periodical or permanent, like the "trust in victory" bonds which played the role of Treasury bonds. Finally, the government issued bank notes. The first "Ho Chi Minh notes" appeared in February, 1945. During the first years of the war, inflation was considerable, prices doubling from year to year, until 1952. The holding of the National Bank (created in 1951) is constituted, in place of gold or silver, by stocks of rice.

EDUCATION

The picture would not be complete if the educational reforms were not mentioned. On the eve of independence,

Ho Chi Minh stated: "To struggle against imperialism, we must struggle against illiteracy." Official statistics claim that from 1945 to 1954 the percentage of the illiterate has been reduced from 80 to 30 per cent., in spite of the war. Primary and secondary education are now unified and the course of studies lasts no more than nine years instead of eleven, as formerly. The teaching of all subjects is in the Vietnamese language. Pupils receive an early specialisation so as to be better prepared for the University. There is only one examination, taken at the end of these nine years' studies, but advancements and promotions are carried out on the basis of the work achieved by the pupils during the school years.

"Our cultural policy," says Nguyen Khoa Toàn, Vice-Minister of Education, "rests on three principles: Nation, Science and Mass. Three means will be employed to achieve our aim: the increasing of the importance of national history in the programmes, the utilising of the Vietnamese language in every matter, and the relying upon Vietnamese realities."

At the present time the Republic seems disposed to favour the maintenance of economic and cultural relations with France. There are still French schools and a French University in Hanoi. In addition, there is a People's University where teaching is in Vietnamese. Negotiations are in progress to define the conditions of the functioning of French enterprises in North Viet Nam. But the policy of the Paris Government seems to encounter many external obstacles, since M. Sainteny, the general delegate of France in Hanoi, has not yet an official status.

A LINGUISTIC PROBLEM IN TRUST TERRITORY

By A. French (Adelaide University, Australia)

IN July, 1953, a controversy, which had been going on for some time, over the use of Pidgin English in New Guinea, suddenly became a matter of public interest in Australia. The occasion was a Press report that the UN Trusteeship Council had urged the Australian Government to put a stop to the use of Pidgin English in the Trust Territory, and recommended that Australia eradicate the language from all instruction within the Territory. A UN mission had previously stated in its report that "Melanesian pidgin is not only not suitable as a medium of instruction, but has characteristics derived from the circumstances in which it was invented which reflect now outmoded concepts of the relationship between indigenous inhabitants and immigrant groups."

Local spokesmen in Australia lost no time in pointing out that it was not within the power of the Australian Government to "put a stop to" the use of Pidgin, or of any other language, even if it was desirable to do so, though it could use its influence to discourage it. However, the use of Pidgin in instruction was a different matter, for here was a question of educational policy on which a decision had to be taken. Either Pidgin had to be replaced, in cases where it was being used, by English (or by some other language), or else the advice of the Council was temporarily or permanently to be ignored.

In considering the question, there was, unfortunately, very little attempt to separate the two recommendations of the Council; both defence of, and attack on, Pidgin *per se* were (and still are) the order of the day; and many opponents of Pidgin damaged their own cases by the emotional, and sometimes irrational, quality of their assertions. But the case against the use of Pidgin in instruction was based broadly on the following considerations. Firstly, any time spent in teaching Pidgin is subtracted from the time that could be spent in teaching English; that is, the choice of Pidgin over English as a medium of instruction implies that it is a more suitable medium in the existing circumstances. Secondly, the absolute advantages of English, as an overall vehicle of communication, over Pidgin, can easily be demonstrated: not only is English a language of world, while Pidgin is a language of local currency, but a knowledge of English is indispensable to any native student who wishes eventually to study at any higher institution of learning in the British Commonwealth: the English-speaking student has available to him an enormous field of general, as well as scientific and technical literature, whereas that available to the Pidgin speaker is confined to the local publications of government or missions: it is further objected that Pidgin is not generally accorded the status of an independent language at all, but is

considered to be nothing but a "debased" form of English, brought into being by a particular set of circumstances, and unlikely to survive those circumstances.

As against these considerations it has been urged that Pidgin has an advantage over English for the purpose of instruction in New Guinea, in that its vocabulary is much smaller, its orthography is more nearly phonetic (and therefore simpler to learn), that it has some features derived from Melanesian languages which make it easier of approach for Melanesian students; that it is in fact the *lingua franca* of the Trust Territory, and thus deserves to be utilised and encouraged; that it adequately caters for the educational requirements of the vast proportion of local students, the few who are to enter higher centres of learning being reasonably expected to take up English as a second or third language; and, most arguable of all, that Pidgin has already in fact become an independent language, i.e., is no longer a form of English.

An American linguist of international repute has recently returned from New Guinea, where he has been continuing his investigations of the position from a purely linguistic point of view, and his further findings are awaited with interest; but he has already made it clear that, in his opinion, "Melanesian Pidgin should be accorded the status of a true language, and given both popular and official support."* The theory on which Professor Hall bases his case is briefly that what we are witnessing in New Guinea is the growth of a new language, which has evolved in a somewhat similar way to that in which some European languages arose. Thus it has been suggested that the common ancestor of the Germanic languages may have arisen as a pidginised variety of an Indo-European tongue spoken in the Mediterranean region, possibly Venetic. Such a phenomenon as the new function, that of indicating grammatical differences, given in the Germanic languages to the alternations between vowels (as in *sing-sang-sung*) would be an example of the kind of extreme re-structuring characteristic of pidginised languages. It is certainly premature to comment at this stage on the validity of this theory as applied to Germanic, but it is one which linguists must take into account, and it is amusing to imagine the emotional objections which may be raised against it. (Hitler would probably have had a poor opinion of any linguist who might have suggested to him that German was a form of pidgin Indian.)

However this may be, the unique conditions of today may well render inapplicable any theoretical analogy with the past. Linguistic development in any direction is bound to be affected by the speed and facility of modern methods of communication, and the movement to and from the Territory of Europeans who know no Pidgin is likely to have the effect of attracting Pidgin back towards English, in order to keep it within the area of comprehension of such people. In actual fact, under the increasing influence of European culture, Melanesian Pidgin is gradually moving closer to English in vocabulary and in some grammatical features. Rapid communications have already destroyed the measure of isolation which Pidgin formerly enjoyed, and the effect of continually fresh English contacts (commercial, personal, literary) will undoubtedly be to attract Pidgin even further towards the English pattern even in linguistic structure. It may thus be argued that, even if its independence of English be conceded, such independence is likely to diminish as time goes on.

*Professor R. A. Hall, Jnr., writing in the *Australian Quarterly*, June, 1954. I am personally indebted to Prof. Hall for discussion on the present paper in an earlier draft, and for information concerning the situation in New Guinea.

Thus the controversy about the status of Melanesian Pidgin is as far as ever from being resolved. The arguments in its defence can be opposed by objections which are still formidable. Although the vocabulary of Pidgin is very small, that may well be because its subject matter has hitherto been so restricted: but if Pidgin is to be eventually the teaching medium for literary criticism and nuclear physics, its vocabulary too will have to be expanded at a quite remarkable rate. It cannot be denied that Pidgin is much more nearly phonetic in its orthography than English, and the claim that Pidgin supplies the only common language over the Territory must be weighed very seriously. It is also true that some native Melanesian features are apparent in Pidgin; but even the proponents of Pidgin advocate its use as a medium of instruction only in the Territory of New Guinea, where it is already firmly established; no one in his senses would call for it to be extended to the Territory of Papua, where it is not used at present (except around Port Moresby) and where its grammatical structure is not closely similar to that of the native languages.

It is, however, unlikely that the future status of Melanesian Pidgin will be decided entirely on linguistic grounds. There is likely to remain a strong social bias against the use of Pidgin, in that it has commonly been regarded as a caste language, a lingo fit only to be used to those who have variously been portrayed as children, half-wits, or savages. (There is, of course, at the root of this attitude, a quaint confusion of thought: in the comic-paper duet of white empire builder and ignorant savage, it is forgotten that it is the "savage" who is revealing linguistic talent; the form of language which he uses may sound odd to him, but he has no alternative but to use it, for this is the way the white man speaks to him.) Thus it may prove to be difficult to persuade Europeans to accord to Pidgin the status of a full language, even if it be deemed to deserve such, nor is it easy to imagine a British Colonial Servant approving his children adopting Pidgin as their first language.

There is one other very important factor in the situation which should never be overlooked. It is almost certainly much easier, and considerably cheaper, for the Australian Government to make use of Pidgin as a teaching medium in the schools of the Territory. A strong objection to the replacement of Pidgin by English at all levels of instruction is that the administering government would find the greatest difficulty in providing the teachers and finance for such a scheme. At present the Australian Government is faced with an acute shortage of teachers for its own schools, and all the Australian States have a critical problem on their hands in meeting their own educational requirements over the next ten years, when the increase in school population is expected to be huge. In these circumstances it may prove to be extremely difficult for an Australian Federal Government to take decisions which would involve the extensive diversion of men, money, and materials sorely needed by the States, to the Trust Territory; and a very strong case indeed must be made to justify such a diversion. Thus it may happen that the support lent to Pidgin by linguists like Professor Hall, a support based on scholarly grounds, may be shared by the Australian Government on grounds which are anything but scholarly. Even with the best of intentions, Australia is hampered in its educational policy for the Trust Territory, because it lacks sufficient capital for the full development of Australia itself; but the question whether, in view of this, Australia is the best nation to administer the Territory, is a very embarrassing one, since the control of New Guinea is deemed to be of vital importance to Australia on the grounds of defence. It is often argued that, given the capital resources available, the extensive

use of Pidgin as a teaching medium is the most sensible and economical solution. This may be countered by the suggestion that such use of Pidgin should be judged solely on its merits, and if the present situation is found to be unsatisfactory, the onus will then be on the Australian Government to provide more money in order to justify its control of the territory. But before any pressure may reasonably be brought on the government, either through the Trusteeship Council or in any other way, the facts of the case have to be fully examined, with as

little prejudice as possible, and a decision must be reached on the linguistic issue. The final arbiters of the status and use of Pidgin must, in the long run, obviously be the Melanesians themselves, and it is relevant to enquire how far their views are being canvassed in the matter. A good deal is heard about ultimate self-government for the Territory, and it is in the field of educational policy that the voice of the Melanesians needs most to be heard, for there is no field more vitally concerned with the eventual achievement of that goal.

HEALTH PROBLEMS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA—(III)

By James S. McKenzie Pollock

Nepal

THE Kingdom of Nepal is situated to the north of India and can be divided into three main parts: the fertile foothill area known as the Terai, the upland valleys, and the high mountainous regions of the Himalayas. The population consists of a variety of ethnological types: the hardworking rice and jute-growing peasants of the Terai, who are akin to their Indian neighbours, the pastoral dwellers of the valleys where each valley has its own distinctive customs and often language, and the sturdy hillmen wringing out a meagre existence from the upland pastures. Some of these people live at a height of 12,000 ft. or more.

Communications within the country are extremely difficult, and it sometimes takes as much as 12 days to cross from one valley to another. Only in these last two years has the capital Khatmandu been linked with the outside world by air. A jeep road is at present under construction to connect the Khatmandu valley with India.

The civil administration is as yet not well developed, but efforts are being made to establish a democratic form of government.

The medical organisation is as yet poorly developed and consists of a rudimentary hospital system in the capital, and a few medical dispensaries scattered throughout the country. The country has less than 20 doctors to attend to the needs of the seven million inhabitants. A few male nurses have received rudimentary training, and staff the two civil and one military hospital in Khatmandu.

The medical intelligence is as yet ill-defined and has been built up from reports made by various doctors who have spent short visits in the country over the past twenty or thirty years. It is known that malaria takes a heavy toll of life and cripples the working potential of the peasants in the Terai and lower valleys. Filariasis also is present in these areas, and helminthic infestation is widespread. Those areas in contact with the outside world have frequent visitations by such epidemics as cholera and smallpox. Tuberculosis infection is heavy in the valleys, and seems to be spreading rapidly among the non-immune population of the upper valleys.

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During 1954, WHO, and the US Point Four Programme gave substantial aid to the government to initiate a malaria-control programme. A school for health assistants and a nurses' training school are also being established.

Nepal is at present in the transition period between feudalism and a democratic way of life. She is attempting to bridge the gap of centuries in a few years. Her economy is dependent on the export of a few basic commodities and is not of a high order, and she will require material aid from the outside world for some time until her economy can be stabilised. Increased communications are necessary before the bulk of the population can come under the influence of governmental agencies.

Indonesia

The archipelago of Indonesia consists of 13,000 islands, 3,000 of which are inhabited, scattered over a sea area of 4,000 by 1,500 miles—a fact which makes administrative and health planning extremely complicated. A policy of decentralisation is being pursued by the government to compensate for the difficulties of communication.

The country is rich in natural resources but the interruption in foreign markets has resulted in economic difficulties which are probably only temporary. This fact has affected in recent years the import of drugs and medical equipment. Local production is being encouraged. The population at the moment is approximately 80 million, over half of which is found on the island of Java, and it has been estimated that the natural annual population increase is 1,200,000.

The government policy is directed towards increasing food production, industrial development, migration to less populated areas and the improvement of communications.

In the medical field priority is being given to the control of epidemic disease including malaria, yaws, trachoma, leprosy and tuberculosis and to the provision of facilities for treatment.

At the termination of the colonial regime Indonesia suffered greatly from a lack of trained personnel, but training programmes are under way to make good this deficiency. It is estimated that 1,400 doctors are present in Indonesia, of which over 70 per cent. are located in the cities. At a conservative estimate of one doctor for 5,000 population Indonesia requires ten times the present

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
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number of physicians. By 1956 the four universities will be turning out 150 doctors per year, so this means that it will take ten years before the present number of physicians is doubled.

As in most of the other countries of South-East Asia where the bulk of the population live in rural areas, the health cover for many years will be in the hands of paramedical personnel, whose training must be directed towards improving environmental sanitation, controlling communicable disease and supplying a modicum of curative treatment.

Thailand

Thailand is a rich agricultural country producing a substantial surplus of rice for export. Her economy is therefore probably the most stable in the South-East Asia



A Buddhist temple in Thailand being sprayed with DDT against malaria (UNESCO picture)

region. During the Second World War, although she was occupied by Japanese forces, little active fighting took place and she was spared the devastation suffered by her neighbour Burma. Governmental changes in the country have been frequent but the constitutional monarchy has remained a continuous form of government for many years.

The Thais are a happy people with a rich cultural background. The way of life in the modern city of Bangkok with its million or more inhabitants differs greatly from the life led by the bulk of the population of the country who are hard-working peasant farmers. The main medical difficulty facing the administration is to bring a preventive and curative medical service to the scattered rural communities. Communications are difficult owing to the prevalence of criss-cross waterways which make road-building difficult.

The US Point Four Programme is giving substantial aid to the country towards health development. WHO

and UNICEF have helped the government to initiate a malaria-control programme and an extensive yaws-control programme. Urban and rural maternity and Child Health Schemes are being carried out, and attention is also being given to rural health expansion. The medical administrative machinery is being strengthened with special emphasis on increased provincial autonomy.

In Thailand as in all other countries of South-East Asia the main task of medical consolidation, rural health, still lies ahead.

Many of the so-called developed countries in the West have still not yet brought satisfactory health services to their rural populations, and how much bigger is the task among the great bulk of rural populations found in South-East Asia!

The task facing these countries is enormous. At the same time they will require expert guidance and material aid from outside sources for many years to come. The World Health Organisation must remain as the catalysing

agent in this aid. Even on a budget which allows for an expenditure of a quarter of a cent per head of population in South-East Asia per year, a worthwhile job is being attempted in this direction.

The undertaking is a big one but we must not become discouraged by its magnitude. The public-health worker should occasionally look over his shoulder for inspiration, and look back at the gains made in the western world between 1880 and 1920 when in the short space of forty years the whole human environment was changed. The task in South-East Asia may be greater than that which faced Europe and America, but the tools to hand are more effective than were available to the public-health worker during the latter part of the last century and the early part of this.

The next twenty years will see big changes in South-East Asia if the will of the nations of the world to help each other continues, and if the tragedy of war is kept at bay.

(This concludes the series of articles)

THE PROBLEM OF PAKHTUNISTAN

By H. E. Najib-Ullah (Afghan Ambassador in London)

THE new decision of the Pakistan Government to reorganise the administrative set-up of the country by making Pakistan a federation of two units, west and east Pakistan, means the annihilation of the linguistic and national entities of the people who composed until now so-called West Pakistan. We are not concerned with other parts of Pakistan but any decision regarding the Pakhtuns cannot leave us indifferent. It is many years since Afghanistan first advocated and supported the legitimate claim of the Pakhtuns in North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the independent tribal areas, to form their own free state, and she is still supporting that genuine claim and trying to persuade Pakistan to negotiate for a just and satisfactory settlement. This is the only way to secure close cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the stability of that part of the world.

This new decision, which was made by the Pakistan Government when the constituent assembly was dissolved and the people of Pakistan were not consulted in any way, very much upset the Pakhtun people, as well as the whole of the Afghan nation, because they think that this decision is not only against the wish and will of the people of Pushtu speaking areas, who want their distinct entity and complete freedom, but it is also against the two declarations of late Mohammed Ali Jinnah, which he made regarding the independence of tribal areas and the autonomy of NWFP. It is also contrary to the assurances which were given by Sir Zafrullah Khan, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to me personally in his letter of January 1, 1948.

The Pakhtun people, not being satisfied with that degree of freedom which was promised, continued their struggle for their complete independence, while the Afghan Government tried very hard all these years to persuade Pakistan to recognise the legitimate rights of Pakhtun nation,

and tried to arrange sincere and friendly talks between Kabul and Karachi.

In recent months, through the efforts of the Afghan Government and the personal endeavours of the Afghan Foreign Minister, His Royal Highness Sardar Mohammed Naim Khan, it was expected that the Pakistan Government would agree to talks between the two countries, but the decision which was announced recently by the Prime Minister of Pakistan removed all our hopes in the sincerity of the Government of Karachi and their adherence to democratic principles in order to bring about a rightful settlement. It is possible that if the Government of Pakistan does not realise the gravity of the problem and does not revise its decision then no hope would remain of bringing about a peaceful settlement.

In that case the Afghan Government would not be in a position to persuade the Pakhtun tribes to wait for a satisfactory settlement of their legitimate claim. I think it is not necessary to emphasise the resistance of the Pakhtun nation to this decision of Pakistan, which may endanger the peace and security of that area and disturb the peaceful and good neighbourly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan never recognised the inclusion of the Pakhtun nation in Pakistan without its consent, and she is still continuing to defend this point of view knowing that the Pakhtun nation wants nothing more than its complete freedom.

The present arbitrary decision of Pakistan Government is a proof in itself that the claim of the Pakhtun people to win their complete independence, and nothing short of that, was the only way to secure their national existence on the basis of human rights and the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

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STATEMENT BY SARDAR MOHAMMED DAOUD, PRIME MINISTER OF AFGHANISTAN

ON December 1, 1954, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan declared that the Government and the People of Afghanistan continue to have the same attitude in supporting the legitimate claim of the people of Pakhtunistan for their freedom, and as it was stated on many occasions they do not consider the Pakhtun speaking areas as parts of Pakistan. He said:

"We cannot agree to any decision taken about these areas without the consent of the people of Pakhtunistan. We are not concerned about the recent decision of the Pakistan Government to merge the Provinces of West Pakistan, as much as it relates to Pakistan itself, but we consider the imposition of that decision on Pakhtunistan contrary to the legitimate rights of Pakhtun nation."

The Afghan Prime Minister added that the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan during his recent visit to Karachi had explained clearly to the Pakistan authorities the sincere desire of the Afghan Government to establish most close and friendly relations with Pakistan. Sardar

Mohammed Daoud suggested that, for reaching that aim and removing any obstacles, both sides should start negotiations. He continued:

"The Afghan Foreign Minister made it specially clear to Pakistan authorities, that the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of Pakhtunistan by the Pakistan Government is the real obstacle to establish the close relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and he explained to them that as long as both countries do not reach to certain understanding about this matter, and as long as Pakistan Government is not ready to negotiate on the Pakhtunistan Question with Afghanistan, it is difficult to expect any result from any negotiation between the two countries."

The Prime Minister expressed his regrets that while Afghanistan was expecting that the negotiations will take place between the two countries to reach an understanding, this recent decision of the Government of Pakistan had removed every hope for the amelioration of the existing relationship between the two countries.

PAKISTAN FACES THE FACTS

By Bernard Llewellyn

EVEN the ostrich cannot keep its head in the sand for ever, and Mr. Mohammed Ali who still remains—perhaps only by the skin of his teeth—Prime Minister of Pakistan seems at long last to have looked some stubborn and unpleasant facts in the face. Today he is scarcely recognisable as the confident spokesman who nine months ago knew all the answers and discounted all opposition. For it has become clear that nobody quite knows the answers, and even the speeches and handouts prepared for foreign consumption are unable to shake a suspicion that all is not well inside Pakistan.

When I was in Dacca in the early months of 1954, I was often struck by the lack of correspondence between what one read and what one heard and saw. My American friends too were bewildered by the illusions current in the United States about Pakistan. Where was this formidable barrier to Communism? If the Muslim Leaguers were the spokesmen for the country, how was it that their party barely scraped together ten seats in the March Provincial elections? We read, for example, in mid-May, that



The Dacca waterfront from the Burhi Ganga River

Pakistan's Minister of Commerce was addressing women's clubs in New England. According to the *Pakistan Observer*, he told his audiences that Pakistan "had made strides in the last seven years which had no parallel in the history of the world. We feel that despite the adverse conditions and tribulations we are carrying on steadily and now have our economy on a sound basis." Reading such stuff in Dacca, we did not know whether to laugh or cry. A country cannot help being poor, and politicians have a right to be optimistic and proud of such efforts as are being made. But many public utterances bordered on deception, and it seemed highly probable that in some quarters policy was being decided on reports that carefully preserved all the illusions the Americans were anxious to believe about the non-Communist world.

We asked ourselves then whether it was conceivable that any military pact would have been signed with the USA if the opposition to it in East Bengal had been appreciated. Or was it that the big stick policy had gone so far that nobody cared whether people liked it or not or whether Pakistan's relations with India worsened or not so

long as the Russians were given something else to think about? In Dacca we viewed all the mutual congratulatory messages passing between Washington and Karachi as irrelevant trivia that dodged all the issues and still further camouflaged the facts. I was not very surprised to read that the first shipment of American-aid arms, which arrived in Karachi at the end of November, was unloaded in secret!

Only a seer could claim to know for certain where the repository of power is in Pakistan today; but at any rate it is not with the people. One suspects that it lies with the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, and that the Prime Minister—after the one or two alarms and excursions he has had—is now careful to reflect the opinions of the Governor-General and his confidential advisers. Perhaps the Cabinet exerts a certain amount of control over events; it is hard to say. But it looks as though the politicians have discredited themselves, and that the army, the permanent heads of the Civil Service, and the big business interests have given their backing to the Governor-General. In East Bengal, of course, there is no attempt at a democratic facade. Major-General Iskandar Mirza rules by decree, as he has done since May 30, 1954.

It was a memorable day in Dacca when, after the ghastly massacres at Adamjee jute mills, the new Governor of the Province took over from the dismissed United Front Government of Fazlul Huq. The action was taken on the holiest day of the Islamic year when the students were on holiday and the people in religious mood. Consequently, though there were mutterings, there was no trouble. The Bengalis are inclined to be timid in action, however fiery they get in speech or on paper. By the time the students returned to the capital for their examinations, Mirza was in full control, arrests were being made, and life—on the surface at least—went on as before.

It would be easy to call Mirza a tool of reaction, for such phrases come easily to the mind in this age of political clichés; it would be more difficult to show he has made a worse job of governing East Bengal than his predecessors. He is an incorruptible man, and is probably right when he says the politicians have been more interested in personal power than in helping the long-suffering people, and that the country needs strong leadership and must learn the ways of democracy before it can enjoy it. Democracy in backward countries savours of mob rule and agitators thrive among illiterate multitudes. Yet Mirza's problem is the same old one: to improve the plight of the people, and provide the stable conditions of social life. Eastern governments are not saved by pacts and political platitudes when the people have lost hope. For a time perhaps they can be buttressed by force, but only for a time. Unhappily, the disastrous monsoon floods in 1954 cannot have helped Mirza's plans.

In any case, he would have had a hard job to convince the Bengalis they had no grievance against Karachi. They argued that the Pakistan Government was spending the surplus earned in Bengal to finance undertakings in the west. Bengal was milked of its earnings in favour of other parts of Pakistan, even though it had ten million more people than the rest of the country and supplied the

greater part of the national income from its jute. And there were other matters of language and autonomy too. No doubt the Bengalis were thinking in provincial rather than national terms when they argued thus; but it was the way they *did* think; an indication that the idea of Pakistan was not quite so securely founded as some people thought.

How securely founded is Pakistan? That, after all, is the real question behind all the skirmishes and political upsets and Communist arrests. That is the question which has made the ostrich take its head out of the sand and blink its eyes at long last.

When I left Pakistan I thought the country would crumble within a decade: Islam alone was insufficient as a foundation. Compared with India, it seemed to be founded on sand. The geographical separation of the two parts had encouraged a provincialism that militated against national unity. At the same time, any desire Bengal might have to secede from the west would be met with West Pakistan's recognition that she was not viable without Bengal. Bengal was essential for Pakistan's survival. That is why many in Pakistan were glad of the excuse of the Adamjee riots so that the left-wing United Front Government could be dismissed before it began its rule and direct control be exercised over the province.

Yet the problem of Bengal was the problem of Pakistan. The question remained: how long could Pakistan be kept together by Governor's rule and the backing of the military? Not for ever surely, if Pakistan's ministers were to talk of the "free democratic world" without embarrassment. Besides, the Bengalis' grievances were simply festering. When free elections were held again—and it seemed unlikely they could be postponed for more than a year or two—one could expect these grievances to find an outlet. Autonomy would be more in the air than ever; may be even secession. In short, the long-term prospect was gloomy. The only people who seemed unperturbed were Mohammed Ali and his advisers, happily going ahead with the framing of a belated Constitution that looked like representing nobody but themselves.

But at last Mr. Mohammed Ali has jerked his head from the sand and admitted that Pakistan is facing disintegration. He has recognised the obvious after turning his back on it for the best part of a year; he has succeeded only in delaying the inevitable and in losing the balance of his reputation in the process.

On November 22 he announced the decision to recognise the geographical and cultural facts and divide Pakistan into two self-governing units—East Pakistan and West Pakistan. West Pakistan's fifteen provinces and princely states are to be amalgamated into a single unit under one Governor, one Assembly and one secretariat. Bengal, which will be known as East Pakistan, will have its own government. Both units will be controlled by a Federal Government.

Certainly the plan recognises the different interests involved; and if it is implemented it may solve the problem. For once I find myself agreeing with Mohammed Ali. Federation may save the country from disintegration and eventual disaster. Nothing else will.

Letters to the Editor

WHAT CHINA THINKS

SIR,—I do not wish to enter into the general argument about "what China thinks," but I would like to take issue with Mr. O. M. Green about his evaluation of Raja Hutheesing's book, *Window on China* (not, it should be noted, *Window on Red China*).

In his letter to your December number Mr. Green cites the book in support of the contention that the people of China probably do not like the present Government, and that they are beginning to see through the Communist regime. He says that the author of the book went to China full of enthusiasm and returned "utterly disillusioned and distressed." Mr. Green either has not read the book thoroughly or has only digested what he wanted to. Did the book not appear to Mr. Green, as it appeared to me and to others, to be most extraordinarily anomalous in its tone? It is quite wrong to say that Mr. Hutheesing went to China full of enthusiasm; nothing is clearer than that he was opposed to the Peking regime from the start.

The odd thing is, as *The Times Literary Supplement* pointed out in its review, that although Hutheesing's aim was to discredit the Chinese Communist Government's achievements, many passages in the book describe how successful the revolution is proving to be. Hutheesing seemed somewhat confused, and he relates—in spite of himself, as it were—how cheerful the people are, how they get enough to eat, how generally satisfied they are, and so on. It is obvious that what the author saw in China was better than he had hoped or expected. Throughout the book he attacks Communist authoritarianism, and the absence of the democratic idea in China—but he could have done that without going on a visit.

No, I am afraid that Mr. Green cannot use the book to prove his point. He has missed the significance of it; the value of *Window on China* is that it gives—though not obviously—a reasonably favourable picture of the situation in China by a visitor whose purpose was to record the opposite.

Yours, etc.,

Selly Oak, Birmingham.

WALTER BUNCE

PAKISTAN AND DEMOCRACY

SIR,—In the November issue, Bhasani was represented as the leader of the Awami party. In this December issue Suhrawardy is named as President of the Awami party. Could you tell me which man appears to be the more important, or what the relations are between them?

Yours, etc.,

London, N.2.

TERTIUS CHANDLER

(Maulana Abdul Khan Bhasani is president of the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League. Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy is leader of the All-Pakistan Awami Muslim League. Suhrawardy is an active politician, Bhasani is a devout Muslim with radical views who does not wish to take part in Government or Parliament. Bhasani leads only one section of the Awami Muslim League, but by far the largest section.—Ed.)

AFGHANISTAN

SIR,—As your Journal follows the policy of the freedom of the Press I felt encouraged to write this letter and take the liberty of drawing your attention to some points concerning Mr. K. P. Ghosh's article "Afghanistan in World Affairs."

I congratulate Mr. Ghosh for his accurate and impartial discussion of Afghan affairs, but I have found a few discrepancies which I should like to bring to your readers' notice.

Firstly: the government of Sardar Mohammed Davoud and his new Foreign Policy, was not fully interpreted by Mr. Ghosh. Our Prime Minister has inaugurated an open door policy which invites foreign capital and investments for the purpose of industrial and agricultural expansion.

When one takes the basic national policy of this country into consideration, it is obvious that it will be impossible for us to isolate ourselves from either of our neighbours or to attach ourselves to

one of them and refuse to cooperate with the others. A country situated geographically like Afghanistan cannot and should not do this.

We therefore try to live politically as independently and impartially as possible in order to be able to gain the trust and goodwill of our principal neighbours, one of 350 million and, the other of 160 million people. What we expect from the present-day changes is that we should not be considered or treated as a land-locked, or buffer-state country any more, but to be trusted and respected as a fully Sovereign State and helped as such. We feel entitled to receive the United Nations help for the development of our under-developed but rich resources. We are a healthy nation and such help, if given sufficiently and sincerely, will produce wonderful results.

Secondly: the change from absolute Monarchy which had been reigning in Afghanistan from the time of Mahmoud Ghaznavy to the last days of King Amanullah, to the constitutional Monarchy proclaimed by the late King Nader Shah, in 1929, was so short and unadapted to the conditions prevailing in this country, that it does not permit the adoption and application of pure Constitutional and Parliamentary methods as yet. Our Parliamentary government is passing through a transitional period and it will be a long time before we reach complete Parliamentary rule. We are spending the most part of our national income on education. With this programme, though it is not enough, we hope to reach a point where we will be able to persuade our electorate to elect the educated instead of the rich and influential. When this programme is completed, Parliamentary government will be fully equipped and Parliamentary rule established. At present we have a cabinet rule, but the members represent most of the tribes in our country.

Yours, etc.,

Kabul, Afghanistan.

HABIBULLAH Z. TARZI

IRON BULLOCKS FOR INDIA

SIR,—There will doubtless be many readers besides myself who have read the article concerning tractors for India in your December issue with mingled relief and dismay—relief that, as your contributor, Mr. Woolston Smith tells us, "there is a very real prejudice amongst the farmers and politicians of India against the general use of tractors, and this opposition is growing in strength," and dismay because of the prospect to which he points of the tractor finally becoming accepted when an economic electric tractor is developed and produced.

Mr. Woolston Smith is of those who believe in the mechanisation of farming—it is his business to, since your editorial footnote tells us that he was for seven years in India as a sales executive of a large company dealing in agricultural machinery. He tells us early in his article that the land will grow two crops a year provided it gets sufficient manure and water. The rainfall provides the water, and at present the bullocks used on the land provide the manure—though this Mr. Woolston Smith does not mention. Nor does he suggest how, when "iron bullocks" have eventually replaced those of flesh and blood, the land is to be manured. Machines do not give back dung and urine to nourish the land; they merely drop oil, which has a deleterious effect on the earth-worms which are of such value to the soil. Mr. Woolston Smith will no doubt reply that artificial fertilisers are the answer to this question of manure, and he would probably dispute that chemicals are everywhere exhausting the soil and turning, by a long, slow, insidious process, fertile lands into dust-bowls. As a short-term policy machinery and chemicals on the land are the answer, since they achieve bigger crops with less labour; as a long-term policy they spell disaster for all mankind—the ultimate disaster by famine. The earth is like a human being—it can be pepped-up by chemicals, but it cannot be nourished and sustained by them.

Your contributor tells us—what those of us who know something about India would confirm—that India is hesitating between industrialisation and remaining an agricultural country. The word "industrialisation" has become, alas, synonymous with "progress," and both the idea and the practice of it may be said to be politically and economically "all the rage." China, we observe, is taking this road to "solve" her problems... though her urgent need is to grow rice and yet more rice for her hungry millions. India at present has 90 per cent. of her population in the villages, yet even so, as we know, she is subject to periodic terrible famines, in spite of the import of

rice from Burma. The world's need, as Lord Boyd Orr and others are continually stressing, is to *grow more food*, and the ultimate problem, as Boyd Orr some time ago pointed out, is not who fights who and who wins, but of humanity being able to support itself on the face of the earth at all. Between increased industrialisation and

the final acceptance of "iron bullocks"—in India and the East generally—Boyd Orr's assertion is likely to come true in our time, and starvation will not be confined to the East.

Yours, etc.,

London, S.W.19

ETHEL MANNIN.


LONDON NOTEBOOK

Shell Film on Indonesia

A unique example of the close relationship between art and industry that has become a feature of modern life are the films produced by the Shell Petroleum Company. In the last twenty years Shell has made over a hundred short films as part of their policy of maintaining an intelligent link between the industry and the public. Besides introducing a new technique of advertising (where no direct reference is made to the Company or any of its products), these films have also set a new style in documentaries. Scientific and industrial subjects which are apparently of little appeal to laymen, are presented in a way that simplifies and explains in common terms the intricacies of modern technology while maintaining at a high level the artistic rules of cinema. Imaginative direction and camera work bring out the hidden aesthetic quality of technical subjects and their inherent dramatic appeal. A gear wheel or a gas turbine becomes as alive and romantic as human characters on the screen.

Another interesting aspect of these films is their value as an international bridge. The activities of the Shell Film Unit have extended to regions as wide as Australia and Venezuela, Holland and Indonesia. The Unit is now busy in India. Wherever it functions, it is, I understand, the policy of Shell to collaborate with local technical and creative talent as much as possible.

One of Shell's recent films is about "The Search For Oil" in the jungles of Indonesia. It gives a vivid picture of the laborious and



From "The Search for Oil." A field geologist party on a jungle river (Shell)

costly processes by which oil is located. Aerial photography for maps, geological survey, gravimetric and seismic survey, fossil interpretation, all these highly technical methods are used to form a picture of the underground rock formation and to select a suitable spot for drilling. Animated diagrams assist the attractive actuality photography in making this film a very educative and entertaining half-hour.

A. M. ABRAHAM.

Asian Music Circle

It is a measure of the increasing interest shown in Britain in the music of Asian countries that the Asian Music Circle, which was started in London only a year ago, has now decided to form three branches. Manchester, Cambridge and Oxford will soon

have their own devotees of oriental music and, in course of time, other towns will organise theirs.

An evening of Indonesian music and dances at the Indonesian Embassy in December marked the first anniversary of the Music Circle. The programme, which

was held in cooperation with the cultural department of the Embassy, included music from the Bataklands, music and dances from North Celebes, a Javanese dance and also poems and songs from Central Java, sung by Dr. Moerdowo, the Cultural Attaché. The Indonesian Ambassador was among those present. The Chairman of the Asian Music Circle, Mr. Ayana Deva Angadi, spoke of the Circle's progress in the last year and of its future plans.

Japanese Dancers in London

Londoners, last month, had the opportunity of seeing something of Japanese dancing for the first time. The company of Miho Hanayagui, although small, was able to convey much of the spirit of Kabuki, even if the derivation was in many dances only suggested, and many concessions had to be made for European taste. But it would be difficult to criticise the overall gentle and charming effect of the stylised gestures, the brilliant costumes and the liquid resonant musical accompaniment on the Japanese koto (harp) and samisen (guitar).

Miho Hanayagui showed great virtuosity and originality, and in one of the dances, "The Marionette," she displayed, using realistic doll-like movements, technique and finish which made her performance quite outstanding. We must indeed be grateful to Miss Hanayagui and her company for giving us an attractive glimpse of the Japan of one's imagination—the Japan of cherry blossom, kimonos, swaying lanterns and fluttering fans.



FROM ALL QUARTERS

Canal Water Dispute

The World Bank announced last month that India and Pakistan have resumed discussions in Washington to try to end their dispute over the division of water of the six rivers of the Indus river basin.

These discussions are the outcome of an offer made in 1951 by Mr. Eugene Black, President of the Bank, to extend the Bank's good offices in an attempt to find a workable solution for the problem. A working party of engineers representing the two countries and the Bank met first on May 7, 1952. During the following two years a great deal of data was collected and existing irrigation schemes were examined. The working party did not reach agreement on the basis for the preparation of a comprehensive plan, but on February 5, 1954, the Bank put forward a proposal to India and Pakistan as a basis for the preparation of the comprehensive plan.

After further exchanges of views with the two governments, the Bank recently extended an invitation to the two Prime Ministers, suggesting that the discussions be resumed in order to work out a detailed engineering plan for the use of the Indus waters, taking the division of waters proposed by the Bank as a starting point. The two governments accepted the Bank's invitation and the discussions are being resumed on this basis.

The compromise proposed by the World Bank suggested that the flow of the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab should be for the exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan except for a small amount of the Jhelum used in Kashmir. The entire flow of the eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej would be available for India except for a specified transition period for Pakistan to withdraw water from these three rivers. Under the proposal, Pakistan would get 97 million acre feet of water and India 22 million. India proposed 29 million acre feet for its own use and 90 million for Pakistan, while the Pakistan Government had urged 15.5 million acre feet for India and 102.5 million acre feet for itself.

Indian Special Mission in Cambodia

The Government of India will establish a special mission in Cambodia in order to strengthen the friendly relations already existing between the two countries. The mission will be headed by Mr. B. K. Acharya as political representative with the personal rank of Minister.

China-USSR Railway

An agreement was recently signed between China and the USSR concerning the building of a railway from Lanchow in China to Alma Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan.

The new line will enable South-East Kazakhstan to be developed as a lumbering district, since it passes through an important timber area abounding in Tien Shan firs. Hitherto, the exploitation of these forests has been neglected owing to lack of transport. An expedition from the Kazakh Academy of Sciences has ascertained that the Ili valley, South-East Kazakhstan, has deposits of minerals, anthracite and marble.

Aid to Korea

Large-scale aid from Russia, China and the eastern European countries is helping to rehabilitate war-damaged North Korea. This has been reported in the Hungarian Press by Mr. Istvan Vellay and Mr. Sandor Mandel, two Hungarian architects who have just returned from a visit to that country.

They stated that Pyongyang is being completely replanned with avenues 150 feet wide. In 20 years it is to have a population of 800,000.

Soviet assistance to North Korea consists of supplying equipment for construction or restoration of metallurgical, cement, chemical, engineering and power plants. Consumer goods and transport equipment are also coming from Russia. Soviet engineers are helping in the work.

China is sending foodstuffs, consumer goods, and textiles, and Chinese engineers are working on the restoration of roads, bridges and railways.

Czechoslovak experts are helping to plan power stations, electrical engineering factories and a motor-car factory.

Poland is assisting in the reconstruction of a locomotive factory and in the mining industry, while Hungary has exported a complete machine-tool factory, a chemical factory, and a precision instrument plant to North Korea.

After visiting engineering, textile, chemical and brick factories, power stations and oil refineries, Mr. Vellay and Mr. Mandel stated that they had found industrial standards in North Korea well up to the European level. There was, however, a serious lack of skilled personnel. It is reported that several hundred young Koreans are studying in Russia and other eastern European countries.

In South Korea the \$280 million economic programme now being launched by the US provides assistance for all branches of the country's economy. The primary emphasis will be placed on rebuilding power plants, improving transport facilities and importing large quantities of raw materials and consumer goods required to offset the mounting inflation brought on by huge expenditures for the ROK army. The provision of relief in the form of food, medical supplies clothing and housing material is being supervised by the US army. Other activities including the reconstruction of Korean mines, small industries, health and education facilities and fisheries are under the direction of the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency.

New Governor for Reserve Bank of India

The appointment of Mr. N. R. Pillai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs, as Governor of the Reserve Bank of India was recently announced in New Delhi. Mr. Pillai, one of India's most distinguished civil servants, will take over his new post on the expiry of the extended term of the present Governor, Mr. B. Rama Rau, on June 30, 1955.

West Pacific Island Development

The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, Sir Robert Stanley, paid a visit to London last month to discuss development plans for the islands under his control. He is especially interested in encouraging an expansion of private enterprise in the islands, particularly in cocoa and copra production.

British Refugee Work in Hong Kong praised

Admiration for the work done by the British authorities in Hong Kong for Chinese refugees was expressed by Dr. Edvard Hambro, Norwegian member of the UN Consultative Refugees Committee. At a meeting of the Committee in Geneva recently. Dr. Hambro said that there is still much to be done, but it was unfair to expect the British authorities to bear the whole responsibility. He suggested that a fund of 10 million dollars should be raised and used for the refugees.

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BOOKS on the

Chinese Thought From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung by H. G. CREEL (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 21s.)

A more appropriate statement of the limits of this work would have been "from Confucius to Han times." Professor Creel does, however, defend both the choice of representative thinkers, and the fact that almost two-thirds of the book is devoted to this five hundred year period: this was, it is argued, the age of indigenous thinking. True enough; but so was, say, Japanese thinking prior to the advent of Chinese influence, so was German thought before Rome came. The aim of the book, after all, is to give a greater insight into the background of recent events in China: that being so, would it not have been more edifying to investigate more fully the treatment accorded to foreign doctrines and philosophers by Chinese thinkers? Buddhism is dismissed in a mere twenty pages, Mao appears, fleetingly, in the last chapter. A comparative study of the adoption of, and attitude to Buddhism and Communism would, at the least, have possessed the merit of novelty.

There is little that is new. Much of the early period has been discussed before in the author's *Confucius, the Man and the Myth*, and this is heavily drawn on. One instinctively shies at the attempt to see Confucius as the forerunner of western democracy. In the earlier book, the reader was given an amount of material from which to form his own judgement, but here, the treatment is much more summary and, since this work is intended rather for the general reader, much more dangerous—especially so, since the view of Confucius forms the springboard for the rest of the book. Professor Creel might have taken due warning from his own statement that "there has been little attempt to use classical Confucianism as the basis of a modern democratic philosophy": where the Chinese, the master of adaptation, has not attempted, it would be better for the occidental not to pry.

Western governments (and the missionaries) are criticised for their patronising condescension over the past century. It would be expecting too much of the author, with the example of another professor before him, to hope for a discussion of post-war State Department patronisation.

GEOFFREY BOWNAS

Green Beret, Red Star by ANTHONY CROCKETT (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 18s.)

Here an officer of a Royal Marine Commando tells the plain, unvarnished, yet exciting, story of two years in the Malayan jungles. Commanding, for most of the time, a troop of some sixty to seventy men, the author, with no small gift for vivid description and a sense of humour seasoning a remarkable capacity for understanding the "other man's" point of view, throws a clearer light on the difficulties and dangers of a night-mare campaign than might be obtained from more pretentious and sensational narratives. He is not discussing politics or even "the higher conduct of the emergency." He sets out to give his ideas "only on the level" at which he was concerned with it:

"What I did know—what we all knew—was that our numbers were pathetically few and that ranged against us were many hundreds of active opponents and the apathy and silence of thousands. Brute force, bullets—which were the least employed of all the weapons in our armoury—were not the solution to the problem. Nor were patrols, ambushes, searches, screening the like, *unless* they were coupled with an intelligent and well-thought-out appreciation of the enemy's intentions and long cast aims."

Against this background he and his men are seen in their struggle with the hot dankness of the jungle swamps, the densely wooded

FAR EAST

hills, the perilous silence of the night and in their patrols which so often seemed to bring meagre results. Yet there is a confident note in the comradeship of many races forged in such conditions. Praise from another service is always sweetest. The Malay police, officers and men, the dauntless Ibans from the Dyaks of Sarawak, the RAF dropping stores, the RASC, who supplied the loads, the Chinese, Indian and Malay liaison officers all come in for admiring appreciation and gratitude. There can be little doubt therefore that Major Crockett's sane and sympathetic attitude on race relationships will have the attention of high authority who may note his restrained criticism of a certain battalion's sergeant's mess which failed to extend the prevailing courtesy of honorary membership to Asian liaison officers.

EDWIN HAWARD

I Married a Korean by AGNES DAVIS KIM (*Gollancz*, 13s. 6d.)

The author met her husband, David Kim, at a theological college in America and after an engagement lasting for six years she was able to join him in Korea, marry him and begin a strange and in many ways difficult life as the wife of a small farmer.

She was faced with appalling opposition to her marriage, particularly from missionary friends in Korea, and, in fact, the marriage was so frowned upon by Christian Church authorities in Korea that David Kim never achieved his cherished ambition of being ordained as a Christian minister. Mrs. Kim says of this that his reaction was to feel that there was something vitally wrong with a Christianity which failed to consider the spirit of self-dedication that both of them held so firmly. Arbitrary judgement was made because they dared to face and live out Christian brotherhood by breaking down the barriers which they believed were un-Christian. Nevertheless, there seemed to have been no bitterness in the Kims and they settled down to their farming, helping to care for the sick, rebuilding their house, digging drains, planting, harvesting—each task tackled with enterprise and courage by the author. In spite of the immense psychological difficulties arising from such a complete change in environment, she was able to adjust herself extremely well and to achieve a relationship with her mother-in-law which was based on deep affection and sympathy on both sides. Without being pretentious or over-chatty this makes pleasant reading as well as giving a good picture of life in Japanese-controlled Korea.

ANDREW WILSON

The Yalu Flows by MIROK LI (*Harvill Press*, 10s. 6d.)

How saddened one is to learn, after reading this delightful autobiography, that the author died in 1950 and the impact of western life on a young student from the Korea of thirty years ago will not be completed. For the beauty of style and of content set this book apart from the usual run of autobiographies. It imparts an atmosphere of grace, perception and affection which is seldom found in books about that still rather unknown country. The book can really be summed up as a gentle, remembrance of things past—a story of a small boy growing up in the midst of some of the strongest traditions in the world. Coming from a home where these traditions were strongly upheld, yet were tempered by the affection of his mother and the lively interest of his father, Mirok Li was a young student when the Japanese arrived in Korea and shattered the even tranquillity of his life. He was forced, finally, to leave his mother, then a widow, and seek refuge in China, eventually to finish as a medical practitioner in a small German town, where he died, obscure and alone. But his book has lasting qualities and has

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been beautifully translated by Mr. H. A. Hammelman, and in it are to be found all the problems and emotions confronting Mirok Li as he changed from boyhood to adolescence, and from an old learning to a new, alien one. A small masterpiece which deserves a permanent place in the literature about Korea.

S. N. CLISSOLD

Typhoon in Tokyo by HARRY EMERSON WILDES (*Allen and Unwin*, 18s.)

Mr. Wildes knew Japan before the war, and as an "occupationnaire." He thus has a wide and well informed background on which to draw for this account of the Occupation: yet one feels that, despite this broad knowledge, and the mass of facts and figures, despite the many criticisms of the work of the reformers, there is no deep understanding of the real heart of the problem. The functioning of the Occupation, as the author points out, is another instance of the old story of "rule by interpreter," and, as he might have added, of the sudden rise to importance of the slick yes-man, or one who was fortunate enough to know the ways of the West, yet who was, often precisely by virtue of such knowledge, quite out of harmony with the culture of his own countrymen. The sort of measure to which such an individual gave the nod would find favour only with a small minority—the greater part of which lived in Tokyo and the other large urban areas.

Misjudgements there were in plenty, for neither the occupiers nor the occupied seem fully to have understood the other's motives or wishes. I loved the story of the decision by Americans to set an examination for Japanese civil servants, and the hedging and manoeuvring which it caused. It was of course impossible to please everyone: when a certain military base was closed, the complaints of the local population who had lost a valuable source of income in the room-rents of the camp followers were just as loud as the previous clamour against the moral degradation in the camp areas. The fault lies, perhaps, in the attempt to please, which has certainly met with little gratitude.

The author concludes that, judged by results, the Occupation was a failure; its measures have either been repealed or, from the start, were tacitly ignored, and the only remnants are the "intangibles"—the by-products of the presence of foreigners in such great numbers.

"Japan is back where she started, but with the difference that she is not now, and will not become, ultranationalist or militarist." I wonder!

GEOFFREY BOWNAS

Mother Sir! by TATS BLAIN (*Victor Gollancz*, 13s. 6d.)

Here is another book where the American Way of Life, or, as it were, the Coca Cola Culture, is compared comfortably to the older and, we are told, more smelly culture of another country—in this instance, Japan. Since the author is not quite

convinced that the comparison is wholly favourable on the side of the United States, the book is readable although it just manages to escape an atmosphere combining drugstores and a Women's Club meeting.

Mrs. Tats Blain, wife of a US naval Commander, spent several months on the island of Sasebo, where with her small daughter Debby she set about making a home with the materials at hand. After two tiresome opening chapters, Mrs. Blain abandons her style of sprightly whimsy and, since she has an apt pen for characterisation and a warm-hearted approach, writes enjoyably of the events surrounding her new life. Wisely, she leaves politics out of it, and except for a tour of the devastated area, understandably dismisses the moral issues of Hiroshima in one short paragraph.

One suspects the author of being more intelligent than her publishers have permitted her to be, but, as it stands, the book will undoubtedly give pleasure to many people. Indeed, it has already done so for I note that certain chapters appeared earlier in a magazine called *Charm*.

F.H.T.

Red Star Versus the Cross by FRANCIS DUFAY and DOUGLAS HYDE (*Paternoster Publications*, 6s.)

One could hardly expect that a book issued under the imprimatur of the Catholic Church would be other than partisan—particularly when, as in this case, the material is based on the observations of some 150 Catholic missionaries who had been expelled from China by the Chinese People's Government. Overnight, they had seen their Church's most promising mission field blotted out, and the purpose of this book is to throw some light on Marxist ideology and tactics, particularly in relation to religious questions in Communist countries. Douglas Hyde, as a Communist-turned-Catholic, finds no difficulty in substituting one form of militancy for another, and he gives in some detail the methods which the Catholic Church must adopt in order to counteract or, at most, combat the ideological gains made by his former comrades. Strangely enough, the methods suggested appear to be similar to those used by Communists—e.g., a solid dogmatic basis, individual conversions, the education of the "elite" and the stress on obedience, together in the case of Catholicism, with prayer and penance.

Although the Catholic Church appears to be prepared for a long siege in her struggle against Communism, one cannot help feeling that, judging by the methods advocated in this book, she will have to concentrate a little more on temporal problems if she is to serve as a rallying point for advancement. This applies particularly to Asia. The era of "rice" Christianity is almost past, certainly in China where on an ideological basis Marxism seems to be firmly established.

P.F.

Nectar in a Sieve by KAMALA MARKANDAYA (*Putnam*, 12s. 6d.)

An authentic and moving story of an Indian village woman's life. Written without any striving after dramatic effects, it holds the reader's attention and does convey the incredible resignation shown by the Indian peasant in face of insupportable disasters—famine, disease and finally, as in this case, the loss of all means of livelihood. The author writes with authority as she herself has been concerned with rural problems in India, but she has carefully avoided any attempt at moralising and confined herself to accurate documentation.

M.F.S.

Ancient Melodies by SU HUA (*Hogarth Press*, 15s.)

This gentle stream of childhood recollections flows as lightly as the music from an old Chinese harp. The author describes a life which was already, during her own childhood,

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constantly undergoing upheavals as a result of contacts with the West. As the daughter of a prosperous official, Su Hua had a carefree and sheltered childhood, although the corporate family life in a household where four wives were constantly trying to exercise their influence meant that relationships, even between the author and her mother were somewhat impersonal and the characters have, seen from a distance, rather vague and shadowy outlines. But the chapter describing Su Hua's foster mother is alive and vivid and is obviously written with great love. The character of the "foster mother" leave a deep impression on the reader. A delicate and perceptive work, affectionate without being too nostalgic.

ANDREW WILSON

Mahabharatsar by J. C. GHOSH (Published by the author at the Calcutta School of Chemical Technology, Rs. 2)

Feeling that the teachings of the Mahabharata have something to offer to the world in its present distracted state, the octogenarian head of a scientific institute has presented us with a brief statement of some of its essential points. Spiritual force and universal love and tolerance provide the key to the world's problems. A Bengali version is also included in brief.


B.E.H.F.

East Meets West by MORGAN PHILLIPS (Lincolns-Prager Ltd., 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Phillips tells us little in this book that is new about the visit of the Labour Party delegation to China last summer. Whether the delegation intends to make available to the public in permanent form the conclusions it formed during the trip is not yet definitely known. This book will help to fill the gap.

What Morgan Phillips, Secretary of the Labour Party, has done is to write a brief resumé of what the delegation did, where they went and who they saw, together with a few of his own opinions and observations. All this forms a narrative accompanying 64 full-page pictures of the tour, all but nine of which were taken by the author himself. He has said that he had never owned or operated a camera before last summer, and it is, perhaps, in the amateurishness of most of the photographs that the charm of the book lies.

There is an amusing picture of Aneurin Bevan using his camera while being propelled along a Peking street in a pedicab, and a picture, with a holiday snap atmosphere, of Wilfrid Burke standing, camera-conscious to attention, in the middle of a road outside the British Embassy in Peking.



Mr. Attlee and the Mayor of Shanghai drink a toast (from "East Meets West")

"One of the great stories
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NO DRAM OF MERCY

Sybil Kathigasu, G.M.

The "Nurse Cavell of Malaya" tells her own amazing story of heroism under Japanese torture and imprisonment. The English press have already hailed this book as "very beautiful and very terrible." *Profusely Illustrated* - - 15s.

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The pictures make the book, as of course they were intended to do, but Mr. Phillips is interesting when he writes that the one thing he and the delegation found in travelling around Asia was the thirst among Asians for knowledge of China. Mr. Phillips came back convinced of the big part China is destined to play in Asian affairs in the future. He is very inclined to believe, as are most people who have studied revolutionary China, that that country leans as heavily, if not more heavily, towards a fellow feeling with other Asian countries as she does towards the Soviet Union.

J. W. T. COOPER

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No Dram of Mercy by SYBIL KATHIGASU, G.M. (Neville Spearman, 15s.)

The quality of physical courage is not easy to define. To those of us who have never experienced the outrage of bodily torture, it is impossible fully to understand what forces of endurance are brought into use, or the reasons for them. We can only admire with compassion, and, where the victim is a woman, with a measure of awe since tradition, rightly or wrongly, has marked this sex as the weaker.

Mrs. Kathigasu never completed the book she set out to write, for the experiences herein recorded resulted in a prolonged illness and her death two years after the war had ended. A Eurasian and practising midwife, she lived with her husband, Dr. A. C. Kathigasu, in Ipoh, Northern Malaya. At the onset of the Japanese bombing of this town, Mrs. Kathigasu moved with her family to the small village of Papan nearby where she remained until arrested and imprisoned for secretly aiding the Chinese guerrilla force. Like any account of life under war-time prison conditions, when the cruelty of mankind in general rises to the surface, the chapters on Mrs. Kathigasu's torture and suffering make distressing reading. Nevertheless, one cannot help being impressed by the strength of her conviction that God (she was an ardent Catholic) and the British Empire would in the end overcome the forces of evil. It would be interesting to know a little more about the reasons which led Mrs. Kathigasu, of mixed blood and conflicting loyalties, to the latter passionate belief, for until she received the George Medal from the King at Buckingham Palace, this remarkable woman had never set foot in Great Britain.

F.H.T.

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Arising partly from these two causes, but also provoked

by a certain amount of local discontent with the way in which the affairs of Bombay were managed, there occurred that strange phenomenon of an English mutiny in India—what is generally known as Keigwin's rebellion. The rebels had a genuine feeling that they were right in trying to get a better deal for Bombay—and who will today deny their contention about Bombay "being the best Port: an l in time will be the key of India for traffique and trade"—and that the officers and men of the local garrison were underpaid. The Deputy Governor, Ward, was unpopular, and the action of the rebels in taking over the island seems to have had considerable local backing. A petition was sent to the King, setting out the grievances of the rebels, and Keigwin administered the island with moderation on the lines followed by the company for nearly a year. He ran the place in fact with such efficiency that he was able to hand over a good balance when the rebels finally surrendered to Sir Thomas Grantham. He made Bombay safer in the military sense and commanded the respect of Maratha, Mogul and Sidi. After the rebels gave in, the company realised the importance of Bombay and in 1687 the order to transfer the headquarters of the company in western India from Surat to Bombay was carried out.

A valuable contribution to the history of the early days of the English in India, and the last but one volume in the series prepared by Sir Charles Fawcett before his sudden death in 1952, this volume is certain to be of the greatest help to students of the period.

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Rama Retold by AUBREY MENEN (*Chatto and Windus*, 12s. 6d.)

This collection of fascinating tales is based, indeed, on the Ramayana, but retold in such a subtle, personal and refreshing way, that no knowledge of Indian scripture is needed to appreciate the wit and humour they contain. Mr. Menen has a felicitous gift for the right shades of meaning, the carefully incised phrase which give his work an overall even texture and finish.

The poet Valmiki who wrote the epic of Prince Rama, some two thousand years ago and whose theme has been "refashioned" by Mr. Menen, was the intimate friend and mentor of the Prince and during the latter's exile, entertained him with fantastic, vivid and allegorical tales. Mr. Menen claims that Valmiki was not a philosopher but rather a sceptical realist and in the present collection of stories can be read much as a parable for civilisation today.

S. N. CLISSOLD

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

The beginning of the year seems an appropriate time to review the glossy covered magazines that make their appearance from time to time.

The most impressive to hand is the *Times of Ceylon Annual* for 1954 (Colombo). The main emphasis is on art and culture, and the coloured reproductions of paintings and Portuguese prints enhance the interest of the articles. The photographic section has some wonderful examples of what can be done with light and shade, and the best plate by far is one entitled "Old Moor," by A. C. M. Zahir. Every wrinkle of the old man's face, every hair of his beard is so clearly defined that it might almost be in the third dimension. Of particular interest are John Berger's article on the paintings of the well-known Ceylonese artist Justin Daraniyagala, and the article by E. R. Sarathchandra on *kolam*, which is the art of caricature and mime with the aid of masks. *Kolam* is now only performed in one area of Ceylon, around Ambalangoda.

It is a pity that the opening sentences of an article on painted faces in the Chinese theatre by Ma Yen-hsiang in the November-December issue of *China Reconstructs* (Peking), are tainted with propaganda, for a reader might be inclined not to read farther. That would be a pity, as in the brief space of a page there is a wealth of information on the subject. It is well that it has been set down, together with magnificent coloured photographs that show which painted face means what character, for the writer says in the final paragraph that modifications of the art form will no doubt be made under the new regime in China.

The Pakistan Quarterly (Karachi) is a well-produced magazine, which always has an article on some aspect of Pakistan art. In the August number it is on Fyze Rahamin, who as well as being a well-known painter, is also a poet and novelist. His pictures, several of which are produced in this issue, have nothing in common with modern art, and have a traditional Oriental style about them. There is, in his landscapes, something of the delicacy of the Moghul paintings. The issue of the quarterly also contains an interesting, well-illustrated article on Chittagong in the 18th century.

A staff writer in the October issue of the Rangoon monthly *The Guardian* is bemoaning the negative function of the Union School of Art. He says that there is a lack of equipment, and that the Ministry of Planning does not take enough interest, but why does he lament? The school has just held its first exhibition which attracted many visitors in Rangoon, almost a hundred students are graduating this year, and the writer comments favourably on their enthusiasm. It might be useful if *The Guardian* could in the future reproduce some of the pictures by Burmese artists.

Raphael Patai has a very erudite article in the August issue of *United Asia* (Bombay) on the way cultural changes of a country emanate from the urban centres towards the rural sector. He says that such a premise is doubly true of the Islamic world, and goes on to examine this, and the infiltration of western ideas and culture into the Middle East.

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CULTURAL TRENDS IN THAILAND TODAY

By our Bangkok Correspondent

THAI culture is rather a vague term because, while the country abounds in things which could not be anything else than Thai, their (so to speak) component parts are generally foreign. The point is well illustrated by the Thai holy of holies, the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, which is also the Chapel Royal. Its modified Chinese roofs uphold glittering yellow tiles like those of the Forbidden City in the heart of Peking; its spires and steeples are reminiscent of Indian and Cambodian prototypes, while the whole is enclosed by a cloistered gallery in which the Hindu Ramayana is depicted against landscapes with a decidedly European touch about the trees and mountains. Adjoining the temple is the old Royal Palace, its principal building a purely Italianate marble hall crowned by a glorious Thai-Cambodian multiple roof, as though an Italian grandee were disporting himself in oriental headgear. An even better example is furnished by dress. Prior to the coup d'état in 1932, the national costume consisted of Louis XIV buckled shoes, long white silk stockings, a panung (elaborate Indian dhoti), a white "mess-jacket" with coloured buttons, and a soft felt hat. Like the men, women have now taken to western dress, but many still wear a *pasin* (Shan loungyi) or a Malayan or Javanese-type sarong with their European blouses. Yet all these varied constituents do manage to produce an effect distinctively Thai. Nowhere in the world will you see its like, unless in Laos or Cambodia which look to Thailand for cultural inspiration.

Well-to-do people in Bangkok live in wooden or brick houses recalling British colonial bungalows of the last century or, latterly, modern American architecture. The only Thai features are well-polished floors, undefiled by shoes, and an occasional Thai ornament, such as a gilded gong suspended from elephants' tusks. Traditional taste has largely disappeared, leaving a temporary vacuum.

The poorer Thais still use the floor for eating and sleeping (a custom once universal in Asia, except in China where chairs appeared in the seventh century). Furniture is sparse, but what there is of it is purely western in design. Even bedding (concerning which most races are as conservative as they are about their food) consists of European-style mattress and pillows with an admittedly genuine Thai sleeping-mat. Food in urban areas is eaten with spoons and forks from plates of western design, as ugly as the cups and glasses which have succeeded the charming Chinese porcelain tea-sets once so highly prized. Real Thai furniture and utensils can scarcely be seen outside the National Museum.

Temples are the greatest strongholds of traditional taste and sometimes display rare beauty. Yet even in these sacred precincts inferior western influences are lamentably strong. Apart from useful innovations, such as electric fans, thermos bottles, typewriters, tape-recorders and radios, there are others harder to defend—thus, cushions and carpets are patterned like those of Ealing or else Port Said, but with even less regard for harmonious colour. The halls of worship have not for the most part succumbed so greatly as the monks' cells and the reception-rooms. At first sight they appear a hundred per cent. "oriental"—that is, until the mural paintings are examined closely. These depict scenes from the life of the Buddha, or from the Ramayana, in richly glowing colours and traditional contours, stories relating to a very ancient past; so it is astonishing beyond measure to find here and there a steamboat sailing through the oriental landscape, or a stiff-collared, bearded, nineteenth century European diplomat standing with his entourage amid the glittering throng of gods, demons, heroes and the hosts of Hanuman, the Monkey-God. Incidentally, lay disciples of the Lord Buddha and mere civilians in the Ramayana are mostly dressed in the Thai costume of not very long ago and live in houses appropriate to the same era, besides being depicted as many sizes smaller than more distinguished beings. These latter inconsistencies are charmingly diverting and perhaps help us to understand later and worse features of Thai culture. I mean that

widescale borrowing of alien forms and objects is obviously no new thing; and until quite recently the Thais were able to borrow to an unlimited extent, harmoniously welding a thousand unrelated strands into a pattern distinctively their own.

At present, the process of borrowing is so swift and so all-embracing as to have outrun the Thai genius for adaptation. Hence visitors get an impression of mental indigestion—perfectly understandable by those who realise the terrific force of the western impact upon Asian countries. Recently a Ministry of Culture has been established. Its work should be to assist in the wise adaptation of foreign influences and in the revival of the finer aspects of Thai culture. Unfortunately, it has sometimes taken another line. While paying some attention to traditional arts and emphasising the spiritual value of the Buddhist Faith, it is also greatly concerned with what the Thais mean by that frequently misunderstood word, civilisation. Here the word is often taken to mean material progress together with the employment of such things as sofas, window-curtains and so on. A civilised man should not appear in public without jacket, tie, socks, leather shoes, and, preferably, a hat—regardless of whether or not the climate makes such things injurious to health.

However, the Ministry of Culture is still very young. It has obtained the services of some leading intellectuals and there are already signs that Thai intellectuals are beginning to reflect on some of the mistakes made in recent decades. For example, in the last year or two has appeared quite a crop of new police-stations and government offices constructed in a style possessing the merits of traditional architecture with a certain pleasing lightness which adds to their charm. At Chulalongkorn University, a new hall is going up with magnificent triple roofs bending beneath their burden of rich yellowish-orange tiles; the entrances are guarded by fine seven-headed nagas (serpents), and splendid garudas (man-birds) frown from the corners of the roofs. All this contrasts very favourably with the "Elizabethan" and "Italian" buildings of a few decades ago. It is to be hoped that errors typified by the Hall of the National Assembly will not be repeated. This was erected at enormous cost in a style which must have made the Italian marble of which it is entirely constructed feel perfectly at home. The result is neither very beautiful nor the reverse, but, as a building which should typify the aspirations of the Thai people, it looks sadly alien to its surroundings, a lonely exile from Genoa or Turin—decidedly not Florence.

The signs of a growing appreciation of traditional culture are encouraging, but still rather few and far between. The change does not seem to have affected more than a minority of educated opinion. For example, whereas in India or China a European who takes some trouble to study the traditional ways of life and to comport himself socially somewhat in the local manner is honoured for it, the reverse is true here. The westerner who adopts Thai customs is an object of contempt. On my second day in this country, I heard a Thai of princely family refer to a European, very much at home in the Thai language, as having "gone native"! (Another Thai of my acquaintance whose car got stuck in the sand at a seaside resort complained that the "natives" refrained from helping to push it back on to the road.) Such things are profoundly shocking to the newcomer and discourage him from trying to adapt himself to the ways of the country.

A good deal of modern Thai literature reflects the same tendency towards uncritical admiration of the West. There are a few good writers, but their works are not in great demand. On the other hand, there is a plethora of cheap novels in many of which, though the stories are set in Thailand, the characters wear cowboy hats and gunbelts or else they are dressed for a cool autumn day in Bond Street. In some, Thailand is cleared of its paddy-fields and buffaloes, which give place to ranches, prairies and American-style cattle! Translations of western novels are highly popular and there are some writers who adapt novels like *Pride and Prejudice* to Thai family life.

Films and plays are in keeping with modern Thai literature. I am told that *Macbeth* was once produced, complete with kilted Highlanders playing bagpipes and with a little crooning and tap-dancing thrown in! It must in justice be added that the traditional Thai ballets are still fairly popular and that the Institute of Fine Arts puts on three shows yearly, some of which are in their own way comparable to the finest western ballet. Yet this, the chief of traditional arts, requires state aid to keep it alive.

Except at the Institute of Fine Arts and at Chulalongkorn University, no serious attempt is made to promote either traditional Thai culture (other than religious) or western culture in the real sense of the phrase. The authorities are by no means indifferent to cultural progress; it is a matter of emphasis, and at present the emphasis seems to be on "universal dress." Ties and jackets are insisted on in government offices and nobody would presume to call on a superior in shorts, or tieless, or in traditional costume. At one time there was an edict enforcing the wearing of hats. Hatless persons were debarred from buses, cinemas, markets and so on. So countrywomen carrying their produce into the city, being either unable to afford hats or unwilling to desecrate their beautiful black hair, used to carry two baskets. On seeing a policeman approach, they would hurriedly cram on one of their baskets in place of a hat and defy the fellow to prove that it was not headgear within the accepted meaning of the term. It must be conceded that the British were probably responsible for this unfortunate tendency. In pre-war days, when scientists had not yet pointed out the dangers of confining neck, wrists and waist in a tropical climate, senior British business men were virtuously shocked if a visitor presumed to call upon them lacking either jacket or tie; and it is not many years since the British firmly maintained that a European who went hatless under a tropic sun did so at the risk of his life.

In a certain sense, the British public-school tradition is more alive in Bangkok than in Britain itself. Thai well-to-do families were

once very fond of sending their children to England at a still tender age. After passing through prep-school, public-school and university (preferably Oxford or Cambridge), they returned to Thailand almost as foreigners. Many of these men now occupy positions of social or political importance and exercise a considerable influence on society. Whereas their British contemporaries have evolved with the times, these former exiles are apt to think affectionately of England as it was thirty or forty years ago. They have acquired much that is admirable, together with many characteristics of which the average Englishman is no longer proud. It is quite amusing to witness their horror at the behaviour of younger people affected by the diversion of part of the youthful stream to America. "It just isn't DONE, old fellow." Before long, the American-educated men may outnumber those from Britain, whereupon the process of Americanisation must become even more rapid than it is at present.

I have not intended to be malicious at the expense of my Thai hosts. On the contrary, I realise that sweeping cultural changes require several decades to mature. When the balance of world power forces a people to acquire new techniques in self-defence, they are bound to pick up dross as well as gold and silver. An often unconscious sifting gradually follows and later generations are better able to distinguish the true value of what has been borrowed. Other Asiatic nations have faced the same problem and there are signs that their ancient cultures are by no means moribund, especially in those countries which suffered most under western colonialism. The militant nationalism to which it gave rise has shown this virtue, among some others. Thailand, having avoided that painful experience through political astuteness and the jealousies of rival powers, is behindhand in regaining respect for its multicoloured inheritance. Fortunately, the Monarchy and the Buddhist Church have enabled many fine artistic, cultural and ceremonial traditions to be preserved. As Asia continues to come back into its own, Thailand will doubtless follow the example of India and other countries in revivifying the best of the past while retaining her hold on the present.

BURMESE CULTURE AND THE WEST

By Ethel Mannin

ALTHOUGH I did not stay to see in Rangoon that aspect of the national culture represented by the dancing, pageantry and tableaux of the *thingyan*, the water-festival, I did see, earlier on, a very fine expression of it in the shape of an exhibition of dancing by the students of the Mandalay School of Fine Arts. The students are children whose ages range from eight to the early teens. They come from all parts of the country and all types of homes, and are not accepted unless it is initially clear that they have a natural talent.

They dance to the traditional music, and such is their physical grace and personal charm that they make of simple exercises in rhythm, done to the accompaniment of only a drum, a feat of the utmost beauty. Their repertoire develops Burmese dancing through its various phases—which includes the Siamese influence—to the present day. The latter is at once livelier and less conventionally ordered—and much less graceful. There is the traditional clowning, miming, and singing, all delightfully done.

The importance of this work of the Mandalay School cannot be over-estimated. It is the answer and the antidote to the westernisation of Burmese culture. Burma is faced with the problem of a younger generation less interested in the ancient culture and traditions than in modernity as conveyed to them through—mainly—

American films. The young Burman like the young Irishman seems to regard the USA as some sort of *Ultima Thule*. Burmese young men and women go to American universities and come back with diplomas and speaking English with an American accent. American books and periodicals are everywhere—outstandingly the works of Dale Carnegie. England, as the ancient enemy, is comparatively out of the picture, but America stands for the sacred words "democracy" and "progress." The USIS (United States Information Service) has its centres in the towns and cities—so has the British Council, but at a *pwé* invariably the open-air film show and the free photographic exhibition will be found to be American. A young Burman said to me, apropos of this, "America woos Burma because she feels China woos India." Quite so; but Burma's Prime Minister is, very sensibly, making alliances with neither of the two great power blocs. U Nu, like Pandit Nehru, avoids the Pakistan road.

Nevertheless, for the young Burmese, America spells something called progress, something called education, with the result that in the towns young people who cannot sing a single line of one of their own folk-songs can rattle off the latest song-hit from an American film. Or a British one—but more often an American one. The West has some contribution to make to the East—as the East has to

the West—but it is not Hollywood “crooning,” or the rubbish from London’s “tin-pan alley.” But so insidious is this influence from the West that even the music of Burmese films has a marked western overtone—as has, sometimes, the dancing at the *pwès*. In this manner is a country’s native culture destroyed.

The success of the Rangoon visit of the Mandalay School of Fine Arts—and the cinema in which the exhibition was given was packed to capacity every night for a week—indicates a lively interest on the part of the general public in the traditional culture, but more than one such enterprise will be needed to maintain that interest as a living force. A great deal could be done, and perhaps will in time be done, through the Burmese film industry. A start has been made with the filming of the Prime Minister’s play, *The People Win Through*, though this is not concerned with any manifestation of the people’s culture but with political ideas, and is more anti-Communist propaganda than art. At present Burmese films tend to be “glamorous” musicals, in the Indian manner, with music—judging by the recordings raucously loud-speakered through the streets by way of advertisement—either Indianised or westernised. If the singing and dancing of the Mandalay students could be filmed and distributed throughout the country, taken in mobile units to the villages, it would be an important and valuable first step in the right direction. Though the towns have greater need of it than the villages, who have not yet fallen under the generally corrupting influence—morally and culturally—of western films. The advent of those entrancing child dancers in Rangoon was something bright and fresh and shining and *apart*, in that vulgarised city of the cinema loud-speaker and the shoddy film.

U Khin Zaw, poet, Director of Broadcasting and authority on music, in an interesting article on Burmese music in the July, 1954, issue of the Rangoon monthly, the *Guardian*, sums up the situation admirably when he says, “The important thing is not to hope vainly for an evolution of Burmese music into something neither Burmese nor Christian nor Romantic (see what happened to modern Japanese music and modern Siamese music !) the important thing is to go back to the purest traditions of Burmese

music to relearn it, preserve it, present it to the world in the way the world can understand it.” And this is what the Mandalay School of Fine Arts is doing. Only through such completely dedicated devotion as the Director of this school brings to bear is Burma’s ancient culture to be revived, maintained, and developed into a living national organism. That the school is centred in the country’s great religious centre, instead of in the hurly-burly of the cosmopolitan modern capital, is right and proper, for spiritually Mandalay is the capital still, and the culture of Burma must always be seen against its Buddhist background.

The Burmese are fortunate in having in U Nu a Prime Minister who is a national leader, and one who is profoundly concerned with his country’s spiritual—using the word in its broadest sense—welfare. Burma’s strongest defence against Communist ideological infiltration is its Buddhist faith. Next to that comes the development of its own national culture, bound up with that faith.

It is no new observation—more’s the pity—that the East in general tends to emulate and adopt the trashier kind of western ideas, from seemingly incurable, endemic, notions of progress, education, racial equality. Western films, unfortunately, are seldom good ambassadors for western civilisation—the authentic western civilisation contained in Europe. It is a pity to find Burmese women wearing mass-produced nylon jackets with their handwoven cotton or silk *longyis*. And a pity that with the great riches of Buddhist philosophy available as a design for living the Translation Society in Rangoon should think it worth while translating ready-made ideas of the your-brains-and-how-to-use-them type into Burmese, for distribution to the newly educated villagers hungry for self-improvement and obsessed with the idea that the West has encompassed all wisdom between covers—from Jane Austen to Dale Carnegie, an idea rendered all the more ironic by the fact that the star of the West is declining as surely as that of the East is in the ascendant.

In Burma, resurgent after the storm and stress of war, occupation, and civil war, the rainbow has at last touched the lotus. A pity to find at the foot of the rainbow not a crock of gold but only a crate of Coco-Cola.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNITY SCHOOL

By A. N. Gillett (Manila)

THE sudden rise of the Philippine Community School challenges the aims of schools in other countries. It is an adaptation of the American community school, and has spread rapidly through the Philippines during the past three or four years.

The basic proposition is that in addition to considering the needs of each child the school should survey and meet the needs of the community which it serves. English training college students when asked to describe the needs of their own home communities are perplexed. It is an entirely new experience for them to set beside their picture of the ideal life, their picture

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of their own suburb where they grew up. This is typical of a prosperous country but perhaps a warning of danger.

In the Philippines, on the contrary, people are acutely aware of what they consider their shortcomings and are anxious to remove them. In a tour of 24 country schools it has been possible to see a wide variety of such undertakings. They were usually carried out by the older children in the years from six to twelve.

In one village the lack of work when there is no rice planting or harvesting, coupled with the usual poverty, was the problem tackled first. There is often a lack of initiative and new ideas in such an area so the school taught the children how to make hats from palm leaves. The parents, with a humility which

domestic science teachers seldom report in England, quickly learned from their children and are now selling hats at the rate of 6,000 a week. Meanwhile, the school, having completed its first task, is running a project concerned with vegetable dyes and the incorporation of gay patterns in the original design.

Many schools have closed the protein gap in the normal diet by building demonstration tilapia ponds. This campaign has been so successful, has been followed up so widely, that it will have an appreciable influence on the country's real standard of life. Here again children helped their parents to dig ponds and brought home the "seedlings" from school to stock the new fish "farms."

Some schools had introduced new crops. Usually this was done by starting a demonstration plot and then offering cuttings to the parents either free or at a nominal price. One village had embarked on pineapples in this way, others had cultivated flowering trees and shrubs to make the neighbourhood more attractive.

In this climate, where there is every incentive to take no thought for the morrow, as many people take chances with health rules as in England with the outcome of football matches. In this field also the Community School has had marked success. The children not only study the subject in school but go out into the neighbourhood and join with the adults in a discussion on how a problem may be tackled. The shade of a large tree provides a good meeting place for such an occasion. Perhaps on other days there may be visits to model health projects, a government expert may be called in and finally

children and adults set to work together to dig, for example, the new ditch.

In England the failure of talks and lessons on health to change habits in the home is notorious. Teachers admit ruefully that the home seems to win. The Community School, by associating parents, children, and teachers in a single democratic learning situation achieves a striking success.

A familiar sight in the villages is the stray pig, the most destructive of the domestic animals. The self-supporting pig not merely roots up vegetables and tramples down the rice but dirties the water and multiplies the flies, and worst of all in doing so it sets neighbour against neighbour. The first step towards better crops, cleaner gardens and roads and more neighbourliness is to catch and pen all the pigs. Some schools contrive to accomplish even this. Dr. Pedro Orata, of UNESCO, has now made famous the little village of Bactad by describing how the Mayor appointed the children inspectors of stray animals. When they reported, the twelve-year-old boys went out with a teacher and caught the pig. It was then presented to its owner who either promised to mend the pig pen or, if need be, the children would do the job for him. There was no fine imposed since education is more powerful than the law and at the worst of times force is no remedy. Gently but persistently the work went on and the wandering pigs became rarer and rarer until the great day came when the inspectors of stray animals could be disbanded.

In these and many other ways the Community Schools have embarked on active work for the community in the belief that citizenship in its best sense can be learned this way.

LAHORE AWAITS THE FUTURE

By H. K. Burki

THE city of Kipling's *Kim*, for 14 years the capital of Moghul India, Lahore is the oldest and, until quite recently, was the largest town of Pakistan. The beginnings of this historic city lie buried in legend; its earlier period lost to history. And in its life of 1800-odd years or so, it has seen great days of prosperity and imperial splendour and suffered terrible ravages such as few other medieval towns suffered and survived. Over-run by the great Timurlane and sacked by Ahmad Shah Durani eight times in 20 years on his way to the Northern Indian plains, by the 18th century Lahore was little more than a walled township surrounded by ruins. But with the coming of the British, Lahore gradually rose again from its ruins to become the modern city that it is today.

Few other historic cities in the world divide themselves so distinctly into components on the basis of history as Lahore does. The Moghul, the British and Pakistani Lahore—each section has its own character, background and even future.

There is the walled Moghul city, which the Emperor Akbar built when he ruled his vast Indian Empire from Lahore. A completely distinct entity, in the walled city live the real Lahories, over a quarter of a million of them, tough, tenacious and with a robust sense of humour that has survived many difficult times. The old houses, crowded inside the massive city walls, show ample signs of decay. The crooked streets are, at places, so narrow that a cortege barely scratches through to the graveyard. The shops and their display of wares is such that if one can forget the electricity poles and the bicycles the scene would appear little different from what it did to the Lahori of four centuries ago.

In and around the walled city are great buildings and monuments of the Moghuls. Adjoining the city walls is Akbar's massive fort which contains Jehangir's beautiful palaces. Facing the huge elephant gate of the fort rise the towering red minarets and white bulbous domes of Aurangzeb's royal mosque, and Shah Jahan's lovely Shalimar Gardens, a few miles away, complete a picture of Moghul grandeur.

With the coming of the British in the middle of the last century

Lahore quickly became the principal town of Northern India. In sharp contrast to the old city the British built the modern civil station and thus emerged many well laid-out modern localities and markets, schools and hospitals. At the time when Rudyard Kipling was working on the staff of a local newspaper the city had already regained much of its old prestige and position and was well on its way to developing into an important metropolis.

Today, the broad tree-lined Mall is Pakistan's most beautiful shopping centre, very much a picture of an English High Street. Here in the coffee houses sit young intellectuals full of ideas discussing politics and the arts, while outside sleek limousines brush past horse-drawn tongas. The British gave Lahore schools and colleges and a university that is the oldest in Pakistan. At the time of partition, Lahore, with its railway workshops, factories and business houses, was thus not only an important centre of trade and commerce but one of the most influential educational and cultural centres of India. Unfortunately, the long spell of peace and order that had paved the way for progress and prosperity was once more shattered.


On August 14, 1947, the day the British left, Lahore was once again burning to welcome a new master. During the bloody riots and incendiarism which followed, thousands of houses were burnt down all over the town. A quarter of a million Lahoris left for India. And when the refugees came streaming over the border from India and nearly a million of them decided to make it their new home, Lahore was bursting at the seams. This created such chaos that for the first 3 years or so little effort was made to remedy the acute housing shortage. However, the Lahore Improvement Trust, a government sponsored public body, gradually set to work demolishing the burnt out houses, clearing the rubble and building new colonies.

In the past 3 years it has built 4,000 houses in five different colonies. At the moment the Trust has 40 minor and major schemes in hand which, when completed, will add 30,000 new houses to the town. In the new colonies, mostly in the outskirts of the town, three different types of houses are being built to suit the needs of various



View of Lahore from one of the minarets

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income groups. The palatial homes in the Gulburg colony, built in ten acres and having over a dozen rooms, cost nearly £10,000. In Samadabad are 4-roomed houses costing £1,000 for the middle-class and lower-middle-class families. Incorporating all the modern amenities such as electricity, an underground drainage system and running water supplies, the houses are built by the Trust and then sold on a monthly instalment basis. Each colony has its own schools, dispensaries, playing-fields and parks, on a scale which appears lavish in this part of the world.

There is at the moment great building activity going on in Lahore. The burnt out areas inside the walled city have all been cleared, and in place of dingy, dilapidated houses and tortuous alleys are now emerging modern blocks of flats, markets, and broad avenues. That, however, does not mean that the city is anyway near becoming a completely modern town free of all the congestion and insanitary conditions that are such a shocking feature of the slums in the towns




One of the four new colonies of Lahore



(Right) The Mall, the famous modern shopping centre built by the British. (Below right) A street in the Walled City with its National Day display of bunting and flags

of the East. That will take many years, much expense and a lot of drive to achieve. Meanwhile, it is in the enclaves that the British built and the housing schemes that the Pakistanis are pushing through where the future of the Lahories lie. The markets and bazaars of the British days, will, for a considerable time, continue to meet the commercial needs of the business community. The hospitals and schools and colleges provide solid foundations on which to build up these essential services. And the new housing estates have given the people a taste, and a liking for, decent houses. In spite of the phenomenal rise in the prices of building materials, private house-building has already started. And at the present rate of construction the face of Lahore will be greatly, if not completely, changed during the next decade. For the time being, however, it is handicapped by the strained relations between India and Pakistan and the uncertainty of its future status.

Tucked away in one corner of West Pakistan and only 20 miles from the Indian border which remains sealed, the city is not as flourishing a centre of trade as it was at the time of partition. There has even been talk of shifting the Punjab Government headquarters from Lahore to some other central place. Whatever happens the position of the city as a seat of culture and learning is assured. And once relations with India improve and trade across the border is resumed, Lahore would become West Pakistan's chief centre of trade with India, thereby greatly adding to the prosperity of the people and the city. Fra Sebastian Manrique, a Spanish monk who visited Lahore in 1641, wrote: "... the riches of the principal street, if shown to advantage, would equal the richest European mart." Lahore stands a sporting chance to win back that state of prosperity and this time show it to advantage.



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ECONOMIC SECTION

SOVIET AID TO ASIA

By Wilfred Ryder

A SOVIET version of the Colombo Plan of economic aid for Asia has been taking shape for some time; the offer of a steel plant to India with a capacity of 500,000 tons annually has merely brought it to public notice.

Soviet offers of economic aid to Asia have been made frequently during the last two years. For long they were so vague that Asians took little notice. Then on January 27 last year the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Afghanistan giving a loan for a mechanised bakery, two grain elevators and wheat silos with a capacity of 20,000 tons each. The Soviet Union has supplied the machinery; Soviet specialists erected it and designed the plants. Soviet cotton cleaning machinery, oil pumps and furnaces are also in operation in Afghanistan and road-building machinery is on its way.

The Soviet Union can now supply technical aid, technicians or training facilities to undeveloped countries through the United Nations, for it has now ended its

boycott of that body's technical assistance programme and contributed 4m. roubles (some £340,000) for the fund created for this purpose. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia and Poland have also ended their boycott and made smaller contributions amounting to some £140,000. *Pravda* stated that "the first concrete applications from undeveloped countries for technical assistance from the Soviet Union have already been received"—from India, Afghanistan and Persia.

In February, at a meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East at Kandy, Ceylon, Mr. Volkov, leader of the Soviet delegation, invited Asian countries to send representatives to visit the Soviet Union last autumn and study Soviet methods of building and work in the metallurgical industry. He said the Soviet Government would be willing to give practical assistance, to enter into trade agreements and to supply industrial equipment and machinery on long-term credits.

Some half-dozen Asian economic delegations have now been to Moscow. Mr. Molotov gave a reception to delegations from India, Indonesia and Burma on September 10; a Japanese delegation arrived the next day. Pakistan has sent an eight man economic mission to Moscow.

The Soviet approach to technical aid for undeveloped countries, with its emphasis on the metallurgical industries, is subtle. It contrasts directly with the approach of the Colombo plan and of American aid programmes. These set out to develop principally agriculture and communications as essential preliminaries to the building of heavy industry. Asian countries are impatient with this cautious approach. They want heavy industry for prestige, and believe the western powers are anxious to deny it to them so that they can continue to be profitable markets for western exports. Russia is not slow to play up these suspicions.

Can the Soviet Union afford to export steel plants or to spare the technicians to run them? Much has been written on this theme in both Britain and America to prove that it is not possible. But the Soviet Union built up its own steel production from 4m. tons in 1928 to 38m. tons in 1953. The target for 1955 is 44m. tons and 60m. tons for 1960. On the basis of this steadily expanding production, the USSR has been able to export whole plants to the satellites—Nowa Huta in Poland, which is planned as the biggest metallurgical combine in the world, the Huetten Kombinat Ost in East Germany near Frankfurt on Oder, the Stalinvaros plant in Hungary on the Danube, south of Budapest. These plants will raise East Europe's steel production from a few million tons in 1945 to 16.5m. tons by the end of this year.

Most of the steel plants planned in East Europe are on their way to completion now, which has allowed the Soviet Union to turn to China. The Soviet Union has promised to supply China with 141 large-scale engineering plants including iron and steel mills and foundries.

If the Soviet Union can do this much for East Europe and China, there seems no reason why it should not be able to supply a few steel plants to India, Burma or Indonesia. Indeed the very rapid expansion of steel

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production in the Soviet Union and the satellites has outrun for the time being their supplies of coal and ore, which is another reason why plants should be available for export. Even if the Soviet Union does not set out to do in Asia what it has done in Eastern Europe, it can do enough so to whet the appetites of Asians that they will believe that the Soviet Union has the secret of the riddle to their poverty, not the West.

There is no doubt that it will do so, for the Soviet leaders see the world struggle not merely as political and military but as economic as well, between two great economic blocs, that of the West formed by North America and Western Europe, and that of the Soviet Union, East Europe and China. Both need the undeveloped areas of the world in Asia, Africa, Central and South America; these can provide the raw materials for the industries of either the western or the Communist bloc and also an outlet for their

products. Whichever bloc wins control of them, so it seems in Moscow, will conquer the world.

The Communist bloc has been producing results in the eyes of Asians. The example of western industrial progress is not attractive to them. It is complex and unorganised, unlike the simplifications of five year plans and annual targets; it appears to produce great wealth for a few, however much it may distribute among the many. The West offers Asia better agricultural methods and roads and railways, which are suspect of having strategic purposes. The Soviet bloc offers steel mills. That makes sense to Asians; it promises quick results. This is the real challenge to the western world today.

If the Soviet Union can supply enough technical aid to undeveloped countries, if the magnetism of its economic progress can draw sufficient of these countries into the Soviet economic, if not political and military, orbit, then their raw materials and vast markets will put the economy of the Soviet bloc ahead of the West.

THE JAPANESE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

By J. Greenhalgh

IT is common knowledge that during the inter-war years, the world's markets were flooded with cheap Japanese textile goods, often sold at prices which were below the cost of production. As a result, thousands of textile workers in the western world were unemployed, and, because of their lack of purchasing power, were compelled to buy the cheapest of textile products, and thus contributed to their continued unemployment.

European textile workers have, therefore, bitter memories of unfair Japanese competition, and suspicion still exists that history might repeat itself. Former Prime Minister Yoshida of Japan, who recently visited England, declared that it was impossible for his country to produce cheap textile goods, owing to the Labour Standards Laws that operate in Japan, and also because they were "suffering from high wages."

Having just returned from a tour of the Japanese textile industry, during which I visited several cotton, woollen, silk and synthetic fibre mills, it is now possible for me to record my impressions of the wages and working conditions of the Japanese textile workers.

During the immediate post-war years, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) as the Occupying Authority, introduced the Labour Standards Laws, which, among other things, legalised the 48-hour week, the 8-hour day, Self-Government of Dormitories, and, in general, greatly improved the working life of the textile workers. Democratic Trade Unions were established, based on the American pattern of a local Union for each of the larger textile companies.

The labour force in the textile industry in Japan is mainly drawn from the rural areas, where the living standard is extremely low. The larger textile companies, known as

the "Big Ten," provide excellent amenities for their workers. A visit to any of these mills would reveal dormitories and Company houses which are often far superior to the homes of the families of the workers; a hospital with doctors and nurses; a dental clinic; a beauty parlour for the girls and a barber's shop for the men; a co-operative stores, at which goods can be bought at prices much below ordinary retail prices; laundries and public baths; schools with qualified teachers; offices for the Dormitory Self-Government Committee; Trade Union offices, let at a nominal rent to the Trade Union; a large recreation room with platform; a recreation ground for basketball, baseball and other games, and maybe a swimming pool.


Inside the mill itself, one would see machinery very much the same as in any European mill, except in the newly-built mills, where every modern improvement in textile machinery has been included, even to the automatic opening of inside doors.

The majority of workers are girls of 16 to 20 years of age (nearly 80 per cent.) and these girls remain at the mills until the time arrives for them to get married. The usual practice is for the girls to save as much money as they can in order to attract the "better" type of husband. The old system of marriages being arranged by the parents still exists, although an increasing number of free marriages gives one the impression that Japan has reached "the beginning of the end" of family control.

Each worker receives an increase in wages for each year of service, and the employer is also responsible for family and dependents' allowances as well as for marriage allowances.

A peculiar feature of the Japanese textile industry, is that no reward is given for increased efficiency, whether it be for better quality or higher output.

The author is the Secretary to the International Federation of Textile Workers' Associations. He has recently visited Japan.



In the medium and small scale establishments, conditions are much different, particularly in the latter which employ 30 or less workers. It is in these small establishments that the Labour Standards Laws are frequently violated, and seldom, if ever, observed. Workers are not aware of their rights, and may be found working 14 or more hours each day, seven days per week. Wages are extremely low, varying from £1 to £4 per month, and there have been several prosecutions for non-payment of wages. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that when the persons responsible for violating the Labour Standards Laws are proceeded against, the fines inflicted are often so small as to make it profitable to repeat the violations. As about 60 per cent. of the total labour force of the Japanese textile industry are employed in these small and medium establishments, which produce for the home market, it will be seen that here is an immense social problem. It is very difficult for the Trade Unions to organise these workers, who often live, and are treated, as members of the family running the business.

During the last war, many Japanese mills were dismantled for scrap iron for munitions, and several others were demolished by bombs. In the rebuilding of the Japanese textile industry, large sums of money were borrowed from the banks, and one of the reasons for the high cost of production is the fact that about 10 per cent. interest is charged on this borrowed money. Freight charges have also greatly increased, thus lending some

substance to the assertion that it is no longer possible for them to produce cheap textiles. The average wages in the larger companies are about £8 per month for women and £15 per month for men. To these wages must be added the cost of providing dormitory accommodation and the other facilities previously mentioned. A deduction of about £1 3s. per month is made for meals, whilst other deductions for health and unemployment insurance, trade union, etc., account for about 17/- per month. The employers assert that each worker receives about £3 10s. in facilities each month, but this figure is disputed by the Trade Unions. Even so, a generous estimate of the wages paid in Japan will show that they are only about one-third of those paid in Europe. If we were to include the medium and small establishments, the average wage would, of course, be much lower. There is, therefore, no justification for the statement that the Japanese are "suffering from high wages," particularly as the wages in the textile industry are certainly no higher than those obtaining in other Japanese industries.

There are 13 or 14 months' wages paid each year, the additional payments being at the discretion of the employers. It is usual for the employer to pay a "year-end bonus" just before Christmas, and sometimes a bonus in June or July. This bonus is a source of grievance to the Trade Unions, because the managements have the power to determine the amount, if any, to be paid. Some textile workers will receive no bonus, whilst others may receive as much as £15 a year.

Prices of articles and food in the Japanese shops are not greatly different from those in Europe. The staple diet consists of rice, fish and various sweets made from beanmeal. It is quite possible for the Japanese to live much more cheaply than the people in Europe, and one of the reasons for this is that the Japanese do not use furniture in their homes. In fact, all that a newly married couple require to start their married lives are cooking utensils, quilts, a low table and one room. As the bride's family or relatives are held responsible for providing most of these, life is made very easy for the bridegroom at this important time of his life.

To sum up, it is my opinion that the workers at the larger textile mills enjoy a very good standard of living whilst they are employed at the mill. The high rate of increase of the population will ensure a continued supply of labour, particularly of young girls. It will be very difficult to improve the wages and conditions in the medium and small establishments, until the Japanese Government show some enthusiasm in tackling the problem by the appointment of many more Inspectors and by increasing the penalties for violations of the Labour Standards Laws.

My tour of the Japanese textile industry was made very pleasant by the willingness of both employers and workers to answer the many questions that I asked. The workers showed a keen interest in the conditions that exist in Europe, and I was able to correct the mistaken idea that the exports from Great Britain were subsidised by the government.

UK EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN

By A. James

DURING the last 5 years Great Britain had a favourable trade balance with Pakistan, namely £15m. in 1950, £6m in 1951, £27m. in 1952, £2m. in 1953 and during the first 10 months of 1954, £19m. The United Kingdom exports to Pakistan, the value of which increased during the 1950-52 period from £41m. to £56m., experienced a serious reduction in 1953 when their value dropped to £33m. But during the first 10 months of 1954 a noteworthy increase of UK exports to Pakistan took place, their value reaching £40,463,193, as against £22,535,862 during the corresponding period of 1953.

A detailed analysis of Pakistan's imports shows the increased competition which Britain's exporters are meeting also in this market. While the imports for private account from UK decreased from P.Rs.270m. in the fiscal year 1952-53 to P.Rs.234m. in 1953-54, the imports from Italy increased from P.Rs.48m. to 51m., from Western Germany from P.Rs.46m. to 51m., from France from P.Rs.16m. to 27m. during the same period. While Pakistan's imports for private account from the USA dropped from P.Rs.82m. in 1952-53 to P.Rs.52m. in 1953-54, the total US exports increased, in fact, from US \$55m. in 1952 to US \$98m. in 1953, and Pakistan's trade deficit with the USA increased from US \$32m. in 1952 to US \$72m. in 1953. Owing to the fall of commodity prices the deficit would have been even greater but for a considerably increased volume of Pakistan's jute exports to the USA (the value of Pakistan's exports of wool to the dollar area decreased from US \$9m. in 1952 to US \$6m. in 1953).

In 1953 the following Sterling Commonwealth countries had a trade deficit with the USA: UK—US \$37m.; Union of South Africa—US \$128m.; Australia—US \$5m.; Pakistan—US \$72m.; totalling US \$242m. On the other hand, the following Sterling Commonwealth countries had a favourable trade balance with the USA: India—US \$77m.; Ceylon—US \$24m.; New Zealand—US \$26m.; Southern Rhodesia—US \$10m.; British Colonies—US \$328m.; totalling US \$465m. In 1953, Canada had a trade deficit with the USA of US \$485m., while the Sterling Commonwealth countries had a trade deficit with Canada of Can. \$274m., that of UK alone amounting to Can. \$212m.

In connection with the Colonies' exports to the dollar area, it is noteworthy that the value of Malaya's tin and rubber exports dropped from US \$398m. in 1952 to US \$221m. in 1953. Dollar earnings of Australia were adversely affected by a heavy fall of returns from wool; India's exports of jute goods to the dollar area declined from US \$114m. to US \$74m., but her exports of manganese ore increased from US \$22m. to US \$39m. during the same two years. The large extent to which the entire national economy of these countries depends on the export prices of a few commodities, can be clearly seen from the fact that while in 1950-51 Pakistan's exports of raw cotton were valued at P.Rs.987m., and those of jute at P.Rs.1,098m. (overall exports—P.Rs.2,549m.), in 1953-54 the cotton exports fell to P.Rs.497m., and those of jute to P.Rs.556m. (overall exports P.Rs.1,256m.).

	1953 (first ten months) £	1954 (first ten months) £
Machinery, other than electric ...	5,935,708	11,511,551
electric machinery, apparatus and appliances ...	2,057,180	4,430,044
Road vehicles and aircraft ...	2,040,082	5,674,327
Iron and steel manufactures ...	1,569,855	3,041,641
Manufactures of metals ...	3,066,365	3,400,350
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
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


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
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

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
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
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
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